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Constitutional Reforms and
Constitutionalism in Africa: Reflections on
Some Current Challenges and Future
Prospects
CHARLES MANGA FOMBAD†
INTRODUCTION
From antiquity down to the modern era, philosophers,
political scientists, and jurists have always recognized the
imperatives of constitutionalism1 and the difficulties of
attaining it. For Africa, after more than four decades of
mostly authoritarian, corrupt, and incompetent rule, the
1990s began with a slow and painful move towards what
many optimistically hoped would usher in a new era of
democratic governance and constitutionalism. One of the
main features of this process has been reforms designed to
introduce constitutions that promote constitutionalism and
good governance.2 Many of the apparently radical changes
that were introduced by these reforms have been widely
† Professor of Law and Head of Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law,
University of Pretoria. Licence en Droit (University of Yaoundé), LL.M., Ph.D
(University of London). This Article formed the basis of an inaugural address
that was delivered at the University of Pretoria on July 21, 2011. I wish to
thank the following colleagues for the suggestions made in an earlier draft:
Professor Kevin Tan, Law School, National University of Singapore, Professor
Christina Murray, Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town, South Africa, and
Professor Francois Venter, Dean, Faculty of Law, North West University,
Potchefstroom Campus, South Africa. Needless to state that the views expressed
herein are entirely my own, as is responsibility for any errors. I would also like
to thank the Vice Chancellor and Principal of the University of Pretoria,
Professor Cheryl de la Rey, who was the functionary at the inaugural lecture,
and my wife, Madeleine, and children, Manga, Njumba, Tosah, Tichanung, and
Bi-Ake for their unfailing love and support.
1. Constitutionalism is a concept that is difficult to define. See infra text
accompanying notes 17-24.
2. The spate of new or revised constitutions has been characterized by Maurice
Glèlé as “a prolonged fit of constitution fever.” Jean Du Bois de Gaudusson,
Introduction to 2 LES CONSTITUTIONS AFRICAINES PUBLIEES EN LANGUE
FRANÇAISE 9, 9 (Jean Du Bois de Gaudusson et al. eds, 1998).
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discussed and commented upon, and some of these studies
have shown that many of the post-1990 constitutions do,
more or less, provide better prospects for constitutionalism
than almost all the pre-1990 constitutions.3 The objective of
this Article is to consider, in light of the challenges to
constitutionalism that have emerged since the third
generation of constitutions were adopted in Africa,4 what
3. See, e.g., JOHN HATCHARD ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMONWEALTH: AN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN
PERSPECTIVE 122-23 (2004); OKON AKIBA, Constitutional Government and the
Future of Constitutionalism in Africa, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND SOCIETY IN
AFRICA 3, 9-11 (2004); Veronica Federico, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS: LESSONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA 1, 1 (Veronica
Federico & Carlo Fusaro eds., 2006); Charles M. Fombad, Challenges to
Constitutionalism and Constitutional Rights in Africa and the Enabling Role of
Political Parties: Lessons and Perspectives from Southern Africa, 55 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1, 2-3 (2007) [hereinafter Fombad, Challenges]; Charles Manga
Fombad, Post-1990 Constitutional Reforms in Africa, in THE RESOLUTION OF
AFRICAN CONFLICTS: THE MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION & POSTCONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION 179, 196 (Alfred Nhema & Paul Tiyambe Zeleza eds.,
2008) [hereinafter Fombad, Post-1990 Constitutional Reforms]; J. OlokaOnyango, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA: CREATING
OPPORTUNITIES, FACING CHALLENGES 1, 1-2 (J. Oloka-Onyango ed., 2001).
4. The independence constitutions that were more or less imposed by the
departing colonial powers in the 1960s can be considered the first generation of
the African constitution-making revolution. See Steve Odero Ouma, Constitution
Making and Constitutional Reforms in Fledgling Democracies: An East African
Appraisal, in REINFORCING JUDICIAL AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS: KENYAN AND
REGIONAL PERSPECTIVES 41, 41 (Kithune Kindiki ed., 2007) (identifying five
historical phases of constitutionalism: pre-colonial, colonial, immediate postcolonial, modern, and contemporary); see also Fombad, Challenges, supra note 3,
at 2 n.2. “The second constitution-making revolution started soon after
independence as African leaders under the pretext of nation-building and
development revised and repealed the liberal principles in the inherited
constitutions.” Id. As described by the late Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere,
the leaders tried to make constitutions operate as “brakes” rather than
“accelerators.” ISSA G. SHIVJI, SILENCES IN THE NGO DISCOURSE: THE ROLE AND
FUTURE OF NGOS IN AFRICA 7 (2006). Neither the goals of development nor
national unity were attained. Fombad, Challenges, supra note 3, at 2 n.2. “The
third revolution that started in the 1990s reflects the attempts to correct the
errors of the past.” Id. In making these classifications, the colonial constitutions
are ignored, as they “made no pretence at being liberal or democratic and were
essentially repressive instruments designed to facilitate the exploitation of the
colonies.” Id.; see Yash Ghai, A Journey Around Constitutions: Reflections on
Contemporary Constitutions, 122 S. AFR. L.J. 804, 808-09 (2005) (describing
colonial constitutions as instruments allowing colonial governments to organize
economies and societies without regard for democratic principles).
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needs to be done to sustain the momentum towards
constitutional governance on the continent. The basic
contention of this Article is that although the foundations
for promoting constitutionalism—good governance and
democracy—have been laid down in these reforms, the
threats of authoritarian resurgence that have emerged in
the last few years suggest that these changes either did not
go far enough or did not address the critical problems of the
moment. The main focus of the discussion will be on
developments in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The drafting of new constitutions and the revising of old
constitutions by most African countries in the 1990s was a
clear recognition of the need for radical changes to the
status quo ante. In some cases, it meant a total break with a
dreadful past—such as apartheid in Southern Africa—but
in most cases it meant recognizing that a constitutional
framework built around the one party system that had bred
authoritarian and dictatorial rule was a recipe for political
instability and economic decline.5 In many countries, the
problems were not caused by the absence of constitutions.
Rather, it was the ease with which African leaders had
rendered constitutions dysfunctional by regularly ignoring
their provisions or arbitrarily amending them when it
suited their convenience.6 The 1990 reforms were expected
5. See Paul Collier & Jan Willem Gunning, Why Has Africa Grown Slowly?,
13 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3 (1999) (“However, during the 1970s both political and
economic matters in Africa deteriorated. The leadership of many African nations
hardened into autocracy and dictatorship. Africa‟s economies first faltered and
then started to decline.”); Savo Heleta, African Stagnation and Underdevelopment 5 (July 2007) (unpublished M. Phil. paper, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan
University, Port Elizabeth, South Africa), http://www.savoheleta.com/
African_Stagnation_and_Underdevelopment_by_SavS_Heleta.pdf
(“Dictators
. . . are one of Africa‟s biggest problems. . . . Those who are on good terms with
the leaders and the elites are able to get government contracts, jobs, and loans,
while the rest of the population and the country‟s economy suffer.” (citation
omitted)).
6. See Grp. of Experts on the United Nations Programme on Pub. Admin. &
Fin., Major Problems and Emerging Trends with Respect to Governance in Africa 16, U.N. Doc. ST/SG/AC.6/1998/L.4 (Apr. 16, 1998) (by Jacques Mariel Nzouankeu) (“African constitutions . . . must be rigorously respected. Governments
must not amend constitutions in order to adapt them to their political ambitions. On the contrary, it is the governments which must adapt to the constitution, somewhat like a tenant adapts to an apartment which he occupies without
having the right to modify it.”); see also Fombad, Challenges, supra note 3, at 3
(“The history of constitutionalism and constitutional democracy in Africa is not
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to provide a new constitutional framework to deal with
perennial ills such as political instability, dictatorship,
repression, human rights violations, corruption and
mismanagement of state property, and poverty, all of which
had stymied progress on the continent since independence.
The 1990s provided African constitutional engineers
with a historic opportunity to correct many of the errors
made in the constitutions that were imposed by the
departing colonial powers at independence. As Cass
Sunstein has noted, constitutions should be designed to
protect a country “against the most likely problems in the
usual political processes,” particularly those aspects of the
“country‟s culture and traditions,” as well as its history,
“that will predictably produce harm through the country‟s
ordinary politics” or its “most threatening tendencies.” 7
This, it is argued, did not happen. While many of the
reforms have considerably opened up the political space for
the ordinary person, they did not adequately address the
institutional weaknesses that made dictatorship and the
concomitant
repression,
corruption,
and
economic
mismanagement inevitable. As a result, in spite of the
progress made towards promoting constitutionalism,
democracy, and good governance, the future prospects are
not as bright as would have been expected. It is no surprise
that one commentator has rightly suggested that these
developments have made power in Africa resemble the twofaced god, Janus, from Roman mythology.8 What can be
done to revive faith in a process that started with so much
promise in the early 1990s?

a particularly happy one. Many of the continent‟s problems have been caused,
not by the absence of constitutions per se, but rather by the ease with which
constitutional provisions were abrogated, subverted, suspended or brazenly
ignored.”).
7. Cass R. Sunstein, Against Positive Rights, in WESTERN RIGHTS? POSTCOMMUNIST APPLICATION 225, 226-27 (András Sajó ed., 1996); see also Fombad,
Challenges, supra note 3, at 3 (arguing that Africa‟s constitutional engineers
missed a historic opportunity).
8. Joseph Ki-Zerbo describes Africa as having “one liberal, democratic,
polished, refined and orthodox face looking to the outside world, and another,
concealed, surly, implacable, not to say savage, looking toward the interior.”
Joseph Ki-Zerbo, African Intellectuals, Nationalism and Pan-Africanism: A
Testimony, in AFRICAN INTELLECTUALS: RETHINKING POLITICS, LANGUAGE,
GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT 78, 83 (Thandika Mkandawire ed., 2005).
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It must be made quite clear at the outset that this
Article cannot pretend to look at everything that has gone
wrong. Part I will briefly highlight the attempts made to
adopt constitutions that promote constitutionalism. Part II
will look at some of the main challenges that have arisen
during the course of the last two decades with ominous and
insidious signs of totalitarian resurgence.9 Part III will
discuss how some of these challenges can be overcome. In
sum, this Article will argue that African countries cannot be
economically viable and socially and politically stable, or
hope to reduce the scourge of disease, hunger, and poverty,
until certain improvements are made to the present
constitutions. This will require ensuring that these
constitutions entrench certain crucial institutions,
principles, and mechanisms that promote constitutionalism,
accountability, democracy, and good governance. Africa has
experienced enough change to bring about a new set of
rulers, but not the profound institutional changes in the
system that made dictatorship, corruption, and economic
decline inevitable. If the momentum for constitutionalism
and constitutional government on the continent is to be
maintained, then the emphasis in the future should now be
on the introduction of the fundamental principles and
institutions that will make the values of constitutionalism a
practical and daily reality. The reasonable progress made in
some countries does not in any way diminish the looming
danger of authoritarian reversal.

9. It is not just the regular rigging of elections but also the refusal of
incumbents who lose elections, such as Paul Biya of Cameroon in 1992, Mwa
Kibaki of Kenya in 2007, and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe in 2008, to depart
gracefully. See PETER WUTEH VAKUNTA, Aporia: Africa‟s Demo-Dictators, in CRY
MY BELOVED AFRICA: ESSAYS ON THE POSTCOLONIAL AURA IN AFRICA 67, 67, 69
(2008) (describing Paul Biya and Mwai Kibaki as “demo-dictators” refusing to
relinquish their power); Muktar M. Omer, Is Africa‟s Problem „Big Men‟ or Big
Colonial Interests?, WARDHEERNEWS.COM (Jan. 6, 2011), http://wardheernews.
com/Articles_11/Jan/Muktar/06_Is%20Africas_Problem_Big_Men_or_Big_Coloni
al_Interests.html (describing how most news outlets identify Africa‟s problem as
one of “big-men-who-won‟t-go-away”). “Monarchies” are beginning to emerge,
with sons succeeding their fathers after staged elections, as has been the case of
Foure Eyadima in Togo, Joseph Kabila in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
and Ali Bongo in Gabon. René Dassié, The End of Dynastic Presidential Politics
in Africa?, TALKAFRIQUE.COM (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.talkafrique.com/issues/
dynasty-politics-frica. Both Muamar Khadafy of Libya and Hosni Mubarak of
Egypt are openly grooming their sons to take over when they leave the scene. Id.
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I. THE REVIVAL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM ON THE AFRICAN
CONTINENT
In many respects, the very essence of a constitution is
its function as a “power map.”10 In this regard, it tries to
provide a careful balance in the way it confers powers on
the state. It empowers the government to be strong enough
to operate effectively while imposing reasonable restraints
which do not make it too weak and create a risk of
anarchy.11 The ultimate goal is to prevent the twin evils of
tyranny and anarchy.12 Looked at from this perspective,
many writers agree that post-independence African
constitutions, most of which were imposed by the departing
colonial masters, were quickly transformed into
instruments of oppression under the pretext of pursuing the
coveted but elusive goals of national unity and economic
development.13 As a consequence of this, most of these
constitutions became the source of tyranny, which in many
countries provoked civil wars, coups d‟états, and political
instability.14 Without effective or meaningful constraints on
10. JAMES A. CURRY ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE 3, 10 (3d ed. 1997) (quoting IVO D. DUCHACEK, POWER MAPS 3
(1973)).
11. See STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 270-71 (1995) (describing constitutionalism as the liberaldemocratic solution to the problems of both tyranny and anarchy). Holmes aptly
captures the paradox thus: “How can we exit from anarchy without falling into
tyranny? How can we assign the rulers enough powers to control the ruled,
while also preventing this accumulated power from being abused?” Id. at 270.
12. Fombad, Challenges, supra note 3, at 6.
13. See Robert B. Seidman, Constitutions in Independent, Anglophonic, SubSaharan Africa: Form and Legitimacy, 1969 WISC. L. REV. 83, 91, who quotes
from the Tanzanian Presidential Commission on the Establishment of a Democratic One Party State in 1965, which states, inter alia, “[t]he two basic goals of
African politics—development and legality—seem inherently contradictory. . . .
Constitutions can never achieve a balance between those two poles to match the
values of every strata in society.” Id. The single party system that emerged,
instead of bringing prosperity and contentment, brought about patrimonialism,
nepotism, tribalism, and generalized corruption. See Bernard A. Muna, Africa‟s
Second Independence, J. DEMOCRACY, Summer 1991, at 60, 60-61 (“Dictatorships, minority governments, and single-party regimes became the order of the
day. . . . Country after country suffered as oppression, tribalism, and gross injustice ran rampant.”).
14. See Frederick Cowell, Preventing Coups in Africa: Attempts at the
Protection of Human Rights and Constitutions, 15 INT‟L J. HUM. RTS. 749, 750-52
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power, it was difficult for many African countries to practice
constitutionalism. And as Okoth-Ogendo pointed out, what
existed
in
Africa
were
“constitutions
without
constitutionalism.”15 It is therefore important to distinguish
between the idea of a constitution and the increasingly
“omni-present”16 concept of constitutionalism.
As James Curry points out, “[t]he distinction between a
„constitution‟ and „constitutionalism‟ is more than a simple
exercise in semantics.”17 Although a lot has been written
about constitutionalism generally and constitutionalism in
Africa in particular, constitutional law scholars, political
scientists, and other social scientists have had great
difficulties defining the concept of constitutionalism.
Although some writers have confused the notion of a
constitution with the concept of constitutionalism,18 the two
are quite distinct. Constitutionalism, as opposed to the
central purpose of a constitution, means something more
than merely the attempt to limit governmental
arbitrariness.
To provide a legalistic definition of constitutionalism, it
can be said to “encompass the idea that a government
should not only be sufficiently limited in a way that protects
its citizens from arbitrary rule but also that such a
government should be able to operate efficiently and in a
way that it can be effectively compelled to operate within its

(2011) (describing a number of military coups d‟états that occurred for
“ostensibly constitutional reasons”).
15. H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions Without Constitutionalism, in STATE
CONSTITUTIONALISM: AN AFRICAN DEBATE ON DEMOCRACY 3, 3 (Issa Shivji
ed., 1991). See generally GN Barrie, Paradise Lost: The History of
Constitutionalism in Africa Post Independence, 2009 J. S. AFR. L. 290 (outlining
the history and development of constitutional governments in Africa).
AND

16. Philip Alston, A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Bills of Rights,
in PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH BILLS OF RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES 1, 6 (Philip Alston ed., 1999).
17. CURRY ET AL., supra note 10, at 5.
18. See, e.g., SIRI GLOPPEN, SOUTH AFRICA: THE BATTLE OVER THE CONSTITUTION
42-43 (1997) (confusing constitutionalism‟s purpose as merely outlining the
powers of the state, which is actually the purpose of a constitution). But see B.O.
NWABUEZE, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE EMERGENT STATES 1-2 (1973) (arguing
that constitutionalism consists of outlining, but also limiting, the powers of the
state and restraining its government accordingly).
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constitutional limitations.”19 In this sense, constitutionalism
combines the idea of a limited and accountable government
and rests on two main pillars. One is the fact that
limitations are imposed on government when it is based on
certain core values; the second is the ability of citizens to
legally compel government to operate within these
limitations.20 In this broad sense, recent literature on the
topic suggests that the modern concept of constitutionalism
rests on the following core elements:21
(i)
the recognition and protection of fundamental
rights and freedoms;
(ii)
the separation of powers;
(iii) an independent judiciary;
(iv) the review of the constitutionality of laws;
(iv) the control of the amendment of the constitution;
and
(v)
institutions that support democracy.22
There are, however, three important points to note
about constitutionalism as defined above. First, it is by no
means a static principle and the core elements identified are
bound to change as better ways are devised to limit
government and protect citizens.23 Second, the presence and
institutionalization of these core elements do not
necessarily guarantee constitutionalism. Nevertheless, their
presence makes the prospects for constitutionalism better.
In the absence of such provisions, the chances of
19. Fombad, Challenges, supra note 3, at 7.
20. See also id. for further discussion of the two pillars of constitutionalism.
21. See, e.g., GIOVANNI SARTORI, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED 307-09
(1987) (listing five elements of what Sartori calls “liberal constitutionalism”);
Mac Darrow & Philip Alston, Bills of Rights in Comparative Perspective, in
PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH BILLS OF RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 16, at 465, 465 (noting ten “minimum ingredients” of
constitutionalism); Louis Henkin, Elements of Constitutionalism, 60 REVIEW 1122 (1998) (identifying nine “essential” elements).
22. For a more detailed discussion of these elements, see Fombad, Challenges,
supra note 3, at 7-9, 11-24 and Fombad, Post-1990 Constitutional Reforms,
supra note 3, at 181-82.
23. In this regard, one could add as an emerging core element the state
institutions supporting constitutional democracy, found in Chapter 9 of the
South African Constitution. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 9.
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constitutionalism are very bleak. Finally, it is the
cumulative effect of these core elements that enhance the
chances for constitutionalism.
The fundamental idea behind constitutionalism is the
need to ensure that a constitution does not become an
ornamental document or a sham that politicians can ignore
or violate with impunity. It must provide a solid basis for
the respect of the rule of law, democracy, and good
governance.24 At independence, most African countries
adopted constitutions that had been crafted by the
departing colonial powers.25 The leading type was the
British parliamentary or Westminster model, prepared in
the Colonial Office in London but slightly modified to suit
the circumstances of the different countries that adopted
it.26 Most of the Anglophone African countries27 that adopted
the Westminster model added elements of the United States
presidential model to it.28 The other major Western
constitutional model that was adopted was the Gaullist
constitutional system based on the French Fifth Republic
constitution of 1958,29 which was essentially an admixture
of the Westminster parliamentary and the U.S. presidential
system.30 This model has been widely adopted in
Francophone Africa31 and variations of it were adopted in
Lusophone32 and Hispanophone33 Africa.34
24. Nevertheless, constitutionalism needs to be distinguished from both
democracy and the rule of law. See Fombad, Challenges, supra note 3, at 8-10.
25. BEN NWABUEZE, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 337-39 (2003).
26. See BEN NWABUEZE, 4 CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 31-48 (2004)
[hereinafter NWABUEZE, VOLUME 4].
27. Anglophone African countries include Botswana, Cameroon, The Gambia,
Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. The World Factbook: Field
Listing Languages, UNITED STATES CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2098.html
(last visited Aug. 2, 2011) [hereinafter CIA World Factbook].
28. See NWABUEZE, VOLUME 4, supra note 26, at 76-107.
29. See id. at 147-170.
30. See Fombad, Challenges, supra note 3, at 13.
31. See NWABUEZE, VOLUME 4, supra note 26, at 76-107. Francophone African
countries include Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Republic of the Congo, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Republic of the Cote d‟Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
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Although
there
have
been
quite
significant
modifications to the constitutions that were adopted at
independence, the changes that have emerged after the
1990s remain largely within the received Western models.
Perhaps what is most significant for the purposes of this
discussion is that recent analyses of the contents of the
revised or new post-1990 constitutions show that with the
exception of a few countries, such as Cameroon and Eritrea,
most of these constitutions have in diverse ways gone to
considerable lengths to incorporate the core elements of
constitutionalism identified above.35
These studies show that the protection of fundamental
human rights and freedoms has become a standard of
constitutionalism recognized and accepted by most African
countries.36 While the quality of human rights protection in
most African countries increased somewhat after 1990,37 as
we shall soon see, there has been a steady decline in the
quantum of human rights protection enjoyed in the last six
years.38
In order to check the abuse of the often exorbitant
powers that many African leaders claimed for themselves,
most modern African constitutions now provide for some
form of separation of powers.39 The provisions dealing with
this in the constitutions of Anglophone African countries
allow for a partial intermixing of powers, which to some
Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, and Togo. CIA World
Factbook, supra note 27.
32. Lusophone African countries include Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau,
Mozambique, and Sao Tome and Principe. CIA World Factbook, supra note 27.
33. Hispanophone African countries include Equatorial Guinea. CIA World
Factbook, supra note 27.
34. See BEN NWABUEZE, 5 CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
(2004).

IN

AFRICA 181-82

35. For Southern Africa, see Fombad, Challenges, supra note 3, at 11-24. For a
broader study, see Fombad, Post-1990 Constitutional Reforms, supra note 3, at
183-95. See generally H. Kwasi Prempeh, Africa‟s “Constitutionalism Revival”:
False Start or New Dawn?, 5 INT‟L J. CONST. L. 469, 469-73 (2007).
36. Christof Heyns & Waruguru Kaguongo, Constitutional Human Rights Law
in Africa, 22 S. AFR. J. HUM. RIGHTS 673, 676-82 (2006).
37. Fombad, Challenges, supra note 3, at 11-12.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 97-106; tbls. 1, 2, and 3.
39. Fombad, Challenges, supra note 3, at 12-15.
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extent is capable of limiting executive excesses. 40 By
contrast, the provisions in most Francophone and
Lusophone African constitutions have adopted the rather
defective French Fifth Republic model.41 Most of these
countries have tried to improve on this model in their
revised constitutions with the exception of Cameroon, where
the purported separation of powers in the 1996 constitution
is purely symbolic.42
Modern African constitutions also recognize and
sometimes purport to protect the independence of the
judiciary.43 Because of the substantial scope for political
interference, however, the prospect for effective judicial
independence in Francophone and Lusophone countries is
quite limited. By contrast, many Anglophone constitutions,
especially those of Ghana and South Africa, contain
provisions that can considerably enhance the chances of the
judiciary operating relatively independently.44
To check against the violations of the constitution that
were very common before 1990, most modern African
constitutions have now incorporated one of the important
bulwarks of constitutionalism, that is, a mechanism for
reviewing compliance with the constitution.45 Anglophone
African countries have by and large adopted variants of the
American decentralized system of concrete judicial review
influenced by the locus classicus, Marbury v. Madison.46
Most of the Francophone and Lusophone African countries
have adopted, with important and significant modifications,
the very limited French system of quasi-administrative and
40. Id. at 14-15.
41. See Charles Manga Fombad, The New Cameroonian Constitutional Council
in a Comparative Perspective: Progress or Retrogression?, 42 J. AFR. L. 172, 17273 (1998) [hereinafter Fombad, Cameroonian Council].
42. See Charles Manga Fombad, Protecting Constitutional Values in Africa: A
Comparison of Botswana and Cameroon, 36 COMP. & INT‟L L.J. S. AFR. 83, 94-97
(2003) [hereinafter Fombad, Constitutional Values].
43. See generally Charles M. Fombad, A Preliminary Assessment of the
Prospects for Judicial Independence in Post-1990 African Constitutions, PUB. L.,
Summer 2007, at 233 [hereinafter Fombad, A Preliminary Assessment].
44. See CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA, Feb. 1992, §§ 127 (1), (2); S. AFR.
CONST., 1996 ch. 8, §§ 165 (2), (3), (4).
45. Fombad, Challenges, supra note 3, at 18-20.
46. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

1018

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

quasi-judicial review before a Constitutional Council.47 It is
perhaps only Cameroon which, in its 1996 constitutional
amendment, copied the French 1958 model in its original
and undeveloped form with all its defects and weaknesses.48
One of the core elements of constitutionalism is the
regulation of the procedure for amending the constitution.
The aim is not to block constitutional amendments
completely but rather to ensure that the process is
reasonably difficult to check against any arbitrary or
whimsical constitutional changes that may defeat the will of
the people.49 The need to limit and control the ability of
African leaders to easily and frequently alter the
constitution as they had done before the 1990s therefore
seemed to be on the minds of the constitutional reformers.
Insofar as the restrictions placed on constitutional
amendments are concerned,50 almost all African
constitutions can be placed in the semi-rigid category,
although the exact extent varies from country to country.51
A good number require that constitutional amendments
should be approved in parliament by a special majority of
two-thirds or three quarters,52 or that failing such a

47. Fombad, Challenges, supra note 3, at 18-19.
48. See Fombad, Cameroonian Council, supra note 41, at 172-73 (describing
how the French constitutional model was not sufficiently mastered nor tested
before it was exported to Cameroon); see also Fombad, Constitutional Values,
supra note 42, at 101-03 (describing how some weaknesses in the Cameroonian
model are rooted in problems inherent to the French Civil law tradition).
49. Fombad, Challenges, supra note 3, at 21.
50. See generally Charles Manga Fombad, Limits on the Powers to Amend
Constitutions: Recent Trends in Africa and their Impact on Constitutionalism, 6
U. BOTS. L.J. 27 (2007) (examining the control methods utilized by the major
African countries to limit the powers of each government to amend their
constitution).
51. Constitutions are described as rigid, semi-rigid, or flexible according to
how difficult or easy it is to amend their provisions. For a more in-depth
discussion on the control on amending constitutions and on the classification of
written constitutions on a range between rigid and flexible, see Fombad,
Challenges, supra note 3, at 21-26.
52. See, e.g., CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA Aug. 25, 1992, art. 234
(requiring a two-thirds majority); CONST. OF NIGER July 18, 1999, art. 176
(requiring a three-quarters majority for an amendment to be considered and a
four-fifths majority for an amendment to be adopted).
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majority the proposed amendment be put to a referendum. 53
In some constitutions, amendments must not only get the
approval of a special parliamentary majority but must also
be submitted to a referendum.54
Finally, implanting and sustaining constitutionalism in
Africa‟s fledgling democratic transitions needs something
more than the mere entrenchment of the core elements
discussed above. What has rightly been described as
probably South Africa‟s most “important contribution to the
history of constitutionalism”55 appears in Chapter 9 of its
Constitution, under the title “state institutions supporting
constitutional democracy.”56 As will be seen shortly, this
provides for the establishment of a number of institutions
with the avowed purpose of strengthening constitutional
democracy in the country.57 Many of the constitutions of
other African countries provide for one or more of these
institutions,58 but what distinguishes the South African
institutions is that they have been constitutionally
entrenched in such a way that they can operate as
independent sites of oversight, supervision, and
53. See CONST. OF THE GABONESE REPUBLIC Aug. 19, 2003, art. 116 (requiring
proposals be put before the Constitutional Court for an opinion, although it is
not clear what the purpose of such an opinion would be); CONST. OF NIGER July
18, 1999, art. 135 (requiring that, failing a four-fifths majority, the proposed
amendment be submitted to a referendum).
54. See, e.g., CONST. OF BOTS. Sept. 30, 1966, ch. V, pt. IV, § 89 (requiring a
referendum); CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF CONGO Mar. 15, 1992, art, 191 (same);
CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF MALI Jan. 12, 1992, art, 118 (same). Under article 99
of the Constitution of Mauritania, the President may avoid the inconvenience of
a referendum by ensuring that he obtains three-fifths votes of Parliament
convened in congress. See CONST. OF MAURITANIA July 12, 1991, tit. XI, arts. 99101 (explaining the process of constitutional revision).
55. Heinz Klug, Constitutional Law, 1995 ANN. SURV. S. AFR. L. 1, 11.
56. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 9.
57. See infra Part III.B.
58. See, e.g., CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA Apr. 28, 1992, arts. 43-54,
216-30, 231-39, 166-73, 187-89 (providing, respectively, for an electoral
commission, a commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, a
National Commission for Civil Education, a National Media Commission, and
an Auditor General); CONST. OF NAMIB. Feb. 9, 1990, arts. 142, 127 (providing,
respectively, for an Ombudsman and an Auditor General); CONST. OF ERITREA
May 23, 1997, arts. 54, 57 (providing, respectively, for an Ombudsman and an
Electoral Commission); CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA Aug. 25, 1992, art.
192 (providing for a judicial protectorate—an Ombudsman).
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enforcement of the constitution. In this way, they not only
support but also help to sustain constitutionalism.
By way of conclusion, it can be said that by the end of
the last century, most African countries were now operating
under constitutions that for the first time tried to promote
constitutionalism.
However,
having
provisions
in
constitutions that can promote constitutionalism is one
thing, and actually practicing constitutionalism is another.
In fact, the past decade has shown the wide gap that often
exists between the constitutional text and constitutional
practice.
II. CHALLENGES TO CONSOLIDATING CONSTITUTIONALISM
The main contention of this Article is that although the
core principles of constitutionalism have been incorporated
in one form or another in modern African constitutions, the
experiences under these new or revised constitutions in the
last decade have exposed numerous structural and
institutional weaknesses and gaps. It is not possible nor is it
desirable to fully catalog and discuss all the issues that
have arisen. A few of what one can consider as some of the
fundamental challenges that have made constitutionalism
under present constitutions neither real, effective, nor
meaningful will now be briefly considered.
For a start, the assumption that the constitutional
entrenchment of fundamental rights, especially the
legalization of multi-partyism, would provide a solid
foundation on which constitutional democracy, a culture of
tolerance, transparency, and accountability, as well as
political stability, and would discourage dictatorship and
military adventurism has not turned out to be true. Patrick
McGowan, in a 2001 study, suggests that although the
period from 1966 to 1970 had the highest rate of successful
coups, the onset of the democratization process has not seen
any significant reduction in their incidence.59 In fact, the
increase in the incidence of coups between 1991 and 2001
clearly contradicts the assumption that democratization
would bring about a more stable political and socio-

59. Patrick J. McGowan, African Military Coups d‟Etat, 1956-2001: Frequency,
Trends and Distribution, 41 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 339, 351-52 (2003).
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economic environment that would discourage military
adventurism.60
In many respects, the main basis on which many
African countries can claim to be democracies, the regular
holding of parliamentary and presidential elections, is
paradoxically one of the main sources of democratic
paralysis on the continent. Most of these elections have, in
the words of Andreas Schedler, provided “little more than a
theatrical setting for the self-representation and selfreproduction of power.”61 Both the old guard “born-again”
democrats and the post-1990 democrats have used
numerous sophisticated tactics to pre-empt and frustrate
any potential threats emanating from popular elections.62 A
common strategy has been for ruling parties to tailor
electoral codes to favor them and exclude their opponents
from electoral competition. An example of this is the
nationality clauses that were used by the incumbents in
Cote d‟Ivoire and Zambia to exclude serious competitors
from the presidential race.63 It has almost become an
unbreakable rule that the party that writes the electoral
code always wins the elections. This is aggravated by
electoral malpractices and other irregularities such as the
disenfranchisement of voters in opposition strongholds,
forging identification cards, vote stuffing, and placing the
conduct of elections in the hands of electoral bodies
controlled and managed by supporters of the ruling
parties.64
Since the founding elections at the start of the
democratization process from 1989 to 1995, the prospects of
opposition parties winning elections have progressively
diminished as more and more sophisticated means of

60. See id.
61. Andreas Schedler, The Menu of Manipulation, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2002, at
36, 47.
62. Fombad, Challenges, supra note 3, at 4. See generally ELECTIONS FOR SALE:
THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF VOTE BUYING (F.C. Schaffer ed., 2006).
63. Schedler, supra note 61, at 42.
64. See Charles Manga Fombad, Election Management Bodies in Africa:
Cameroon‟s „National Electoral Observatory‟ in Perspective, 3 AFR. HUM. RTS.
L.J. 25, 30 (2003) (discussing “at least eight main forms of electoral
malpractices”).
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rigging elections have been devised by ruling parties.65 In
destroying faith in peaceful change through the ballot box,
the ugly spectre of change through the use of force is
increasingly present. In the famous and oft-quoted words of
the late President John F. Kennedy, “those who make
peaceful change through the ballot box impossible make
violent change inevitable.”66 Democracy can hardly be
expected to take foothold in Africa when elections have been
reduced into a process of participation with predictable
results rather than a process of competition with uncertain
results.
Opposition political parties, long considered to be an
essential structural characteristic of modern liberal
democracy, are barely tolerated on the continent.67 In Africa,
the large number of opposition parties often degenerates
into either narrow ethnic alliances or just opportunistic
alliances set up by disgruntled former members of the
ruling single party sharing the traits of the former era:
corruption, personalization of politics, excessive ambition,
and a focus on grabbing power, but with no alternative
program of government.68 Fractious and diverse, many of
the opposition parties, even in countries like Botswana,
Africa‟s best example of successful multi-party democracy,
“spend their time squabbling and in most cases pose more
competition for each other than for the ruling parties.”69
65. See, e.g., MICHAEL BRATTON & NICHOLAS VAN DE WALLE, DEMOCRATIC
EXPERIMENTS IN AFRICA: REGIME TRANSITIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 114
(1997) (providing examples of election rigging including incumbents pushing
through constitutional amendments or declaring a state of emergency to avoid
an election); Nicholas van de Walle, Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa‟s
Emerging Party Systems, 41 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 297, 299-313 (2003) (noting the
use of methods such as clientelism, harassment of the press, and government
monopolies of the radio).
66. John F. Kennedy, Address on the First Anniversary of the Alliance for
Progress (Mar. 13, 1962), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 220, 223 (1962).
67. See generally Wondwosen Teshome, Opposition Parties and the Politics of
Opposition in Africa: A Critical Analysis, 4 INT‟L J. HUM. & SOC. SCI. 287 (2009)
(providing an analysis of the past and present challenges faced by opposition
parties throughout Africa).
68. For a discussion of this problem, see id.
69. Charles M. Fombad, The African Union, Democracy, and Good
Governance, 32 CURRENT AFR. ISSUES 9, 15 (2006). See generally Brian T.
Mokopakgosi & Mpho G. Molomo, Democracy in the Face of a Weak Opposition
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Jean-Francois Bayart‟s conception of the “politics of the
belly” accurately reflects the tactics that the dominant
parties that have replaced the former single parties are
practicing today to perpetuate their dominance of the
political scene.70 The Machiavellian tactic that enemies
must either be caressed by co-optation into the spoils of
power or be annihilated has regularly been used to reduce
multi-partyism into a farce.71 Many of the ideologically
redundant and ethnic or opportunistic parties that were
strategically formed have been regularly wooed away from
the opposition by offers of lucrative and prestigious jobs in
return for the charade of indulging in opposition politics.72
Many Africans seem to feel that elections merely function to
“enable[] self-seeking and greedy politicians to get jobs.”73
The result is that voters are increasingly turned off by
elections, allowing incumbents to inflate voter turn-out
figures, sometimes to the extent that more voters are
reported to have voted than were actually registered to vote
in some polling stations.74
Many of the new leaders that were swept to power by
the democratization wave in the 1990s have done little to
show that the new constitutional dispensation and
constitutional democracy can change the status quo.75 In
fact, all that appears to have happened is that “the old
monolithic one party dictators . . . simply made way for
multiparty „democratic‟ dictators, who have maintained the
inherited repressive, exploitative and inefficient structures
in Botswana, 14 PULA: BOTS. J. AFR. STUD. 3 (2000) (critiquing Botswana‟s
democratic practice through the perspective of opposition parties).
70. See JEAN-FRANCOIS BAYART, THE STATE IN AFRICA: THE POLITICS OF THE
BELLY, at ix-x (1993) (“[N]ot only can the expression „politics of the belly‟ not be
reduced to the sole aspect of corruption, but also it can just as well be used as a
criticism of corruption.”).
71. See generally Charles Manga Fombad, The Dynamics of Record-Breaking
Endemic Corruption and Political Opportunism in Cameroon, in THE
LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE IN AFRICA: CAMEROON UNDER PAUL BIYA 357 (John
Mukum Mbaku & Joseph Takougong eds., 2004) (discussing political
corruption).
72. Fombad, supra note 69, at 14-15.
73. Id. at 16.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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installed by their predecessors.”76 Many of these new
democrats have turned out to be as “corrupt, violent, powerdrunk, manipulative and inefficient as their predecessors.”77
Even the two leaders who are considered to have been at
the forefront of the third wave of democratization,
Nicéphore Soglo of Benin and the late Frederick Chiluba of
Zambia, whose elections in 1990 and 1991, respectively,
“raised high hopes that at long last African leaders could be
replaced at the polls” rather than through the barrel of the
gun, turned out to be huge disappointments.78
One of the major problems that was not addressed by
the post-1990 constitutional reforms was the issue of
African absolutism, caused by the concentration and
centralization of power in one man, the president, and in
one institution, the presidency, and the abuses of powers
that go with this. Many of the new constitutions merely
paid lip service to separation of powers. Under most
constitutions, especially in Francophone Africa, an
overbearing and imperial president reigns and dominates
the legislature as well as controls the judiciary.79 This has
been compounded by the fact that the traditional checks
and balances are either absent or too weak and ineffective.80
The problem of executive dominance is not only true of
highly centralized and manifestly illiberal constitutions
such as that of Cameroon, but also under quite liberal
constitutions such as those of Ghana, Namibia, and South

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.; see also Chiluba: A Hero Turned Villain, TIMES (South Africa), June
19, 2011, http://www.timeslive.co.za/sundaytimes/2011/06/19/chiluba-a-heroturned-villain (capturing the enigmatic character of Chiluba). In the case of
Nicéphore Soglo, he took over from the former military dictator, Mathieu
Kerekou (he had come to power after a military coup in 1972) after free and fair
democratic elections in 1991. Ed Decker, Nicéphore Soglo, GALE CONTEMPORARY
BLACK BIOGRAPHY, http://www.answers.com/topic/nic-phore-soglo (last visited
Aug. 3, 2011). He performed so poorly that in the 1996 elections the people reelected the former military dictator to replace him. Id.
79. See ANDRE CABANIS & MICHEL LOUIS MARTIN, LES CONSTITUTIONS
77 (1999).

D‟AFRIQUE FRANCOPHONE

80. See, e.g., Oda van Cranenburgh, Democracy Promotion in Africa: The
Institutional Context, 18 DEMOCRATIZATION 443, 449-53 (2011) (discussing the
roots of presidential power).
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Africa.81 The imbalance in power among the three branches
of government means that the judiciary is not as
independent as it should be and therefore cannot freely rule
against the government, especially in closely contested
election disputes.82 Executive lawlessness has become very
common in countries such as Cameroon, Ethiopia, Eritrea,
and Zimbabwe.83 Executive dominance is often aggravated
by the hegemonic influence of the dominant parties, which
are usually effectively controlled by the president and a
small inner circle of cohorts.84 As a result, the one-party
dominated parliaments merely rubber stamp laws put
before them by the executive, in much the same way as was
the case under the single party regimes of the recent past.
Executive dominance of the law-making process is
completed by the process of subsidiary legislation because of
the absence of any meaningful parliamentary oversight.85
These anomalies are worst in the Francophone system
where executive legislation, which is the main source of
legislation, is usually outside the scope of judicial review for
81. See generally RICHARD CALLAND, ANATOMY OF SOUTH AFRICA: WHO HOLDS
POWER? (2006) (addressing each area of political power and what impact
they may or may not have on the political landscape of South Africa).
THE

82. See e.g., Charles Manga Fombad & Jonie Banyong Fonyam, The Social
Democratic Front, the Opposition, and Political Transition in Cameroon, in THE
LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE IN AFRICA: CAMEROON UNDER PAUL BIYA, supra note 71
at 453, 480-82 (discussing the role the Cameroonian Supreme Court played in
elections, especially the closely contested 1992 presidential elections which most
national and international observers felt were won by the opposition leader, Ni
John Fru Ndi).
83. See, for example, HATCHARD ET AL., supra note 3, at 59, which describes the
situation after 1999 in Zimbabwe, where the government incited “so-called war
veterans to invade and seize farms without due process of law” and in doing so
not only violated laws that it had passed through parliament but also ignored
court orders and “denigrated the very judges who sought to assert the rule of
law.” Id. As a result, the Zimbabwe Supreme Court in Commercial Farmers‟
Union v. Minister of Lands 2001 (2) SA 925 (ZWSC) at 943 (Zim.) noted:
“Wicked things have been done and continue to be done. They must be stopped.
Common law crimes have been, and are being, committed with impunity. Laws
made by Parliament have been flouted by the Government. The activities of the
past nine months must be condemned.”
84. Fombad, supra note 69, at 17; see also Heidi Brooks, The Dominant Party
System: Challenges for South Africa‟s Second Decade of Democracy, 3 J. AFR.
ELECTIONS 121 (2004) (examining the dominant party effect in South Africa).
85. See, e.g., Fombad, Challenges, supra note 3, at 19 n.56 (citing the
constitutions of Angola, Madagascar, and Mozambique as examples).
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conformity to the constitution.86 It is no surprise that
legislation, especially on electoral matters, deliberately
designed to entrench the position of incumbent parties, has
usually been approved with little resistance.87 A glaring
example of executive lawlessness has been manifested by
the manner in which one of the hallmarks of the 1990s
constitutional rights revolution—constitutional provisions
imposing term limits on the tenure of presidents—have
rapidly been removed in many countries.88 Corruption,
misuse of state funds, and clientelism has intensified and
flourished during this multi-party period as incumbents do
everything to stay in power. There is often no clear
distinction between the party and the state or between state
funds and ruling party funds.89 This is particularly acute in
Francophone and Lusophone African countries where the
system of horizontal and vertical accountability is usually
weak.90 The continuous ability of most ruling parties in
Africa to indiscriminately use state funds for their political
activities whilst refusing or limiting state support to the
usually impoverished opposition parties does not augur well
for democratic consolidation.91 If power in general corrupts,
then it can be argued that “the prospect of losing it, as has
been the fate of many incumbent regimes in Africa, corrupts
absolutely.”92 In fact, “[c]orruption has been extensively
used as a strategy of compensatory legitimization.”93 What
has in many instances made the extensive abuse of the
exorbitant presidential powers in Africa possible is the wide
ranging regime of presidential immunities that enables
incompetent and corrupt leaders to get away with their

86. Id. at 18-19.
87. Id. at 19.
88. See generally Charles Fombad & Nathaniel A. Inegbedion, Presidential
Term Limits and their Impact on Constitutionalism in Africa, in FOSTERING
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA 1, 12-15 (Charles Fombad & Christina Murray
eds., 2010) (noting the removal of term limit provisions in Chad, Cameroon, and
Uganda).
89. Cranenburgh, supra note 80, at 446-54.
90. See id.
91. See Fombad, Challenges, supra note 3, at 40.
92. Fombad, supra note 69, at 17.
93. Id.
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crimes.94 A recent court case involving political
machinations in Botswana, a country that has gained an
international reputation as Africa‟s leading example of a
transparent and fully functioning multi-party liberal
democracy,95 is a somber reminder that in the absence of
water-tight restrictions, African leaders will stop at nothing
in their attempts to neutralize their opponents and cling to
power.96
Although, from a quantitative point of view, a study by
Heyns and Kaguongo suggests that there has been a
tremendous expansion in the scope of human rights
protection in Africa since 1990,97 the actual quality of
human rights protection on the continent, from most
international indicators, shows a steady decline in recent
years. Some indication of the possible effects of the post94. See Enyinna Nwauche & Charles Manga Fombad, Africa‟s Imperial
Presidents: Immunity, Impunity and Accountability, INT‟L. J. CONST. L.
(forthcoming).
95. See Botswana: Africa‟s Prize Democracy, ECONOMIST, Nov. 4, 2004,
http://www.economist.com/node/3364739; Africa‟s Best Kept Secret: Botswana as
„a Shining Liberal Democracy,‟ COURIER ACP-EU, May-June 2003, at 54-55. But
see KENNETH GOODS, DIAMONDS, DISPOSSESSION & DEMOCRACY IN BOTSWANA, at ix
(2008) (“[T]he romanticized Botswana is actually a tightly organized and
hierarchical place with big gaps between power and popular weakness.”). See
generally Amelia Cook & Jeremy Sarkin, Is Botswana the Miracle of Africa?
Democracy, the Rule of Law and Human Rights Versus Economic Development,
19 TRANSNT‟L L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 453 (2010).
96. Motswaledi v. Botswana Democratic Party 2009 BWCA 111 (CA) (Bots.).
Because of factional in-fighting within the ruling Botswana Democratic Party
(“BDP”), the President of the party, who was also the President of the Republic,
decided to suspend the appellant (the Secretary General of BDP) from the party,
effectively preventing him from standing for parliamentary elections and even
more significantly, tilting the balance between the competing factions within the
party in favor of the President‟s faction. Id. at 111-14. When the applicant
challenged the legality of the President‟s action, the latter successfully relied on
section 41(1) of the Botswana Constitution, which states that no civil
proceedings shall be instituted against the President with respect to anything
done or omitted to be done in his private capacity. Id. at 118; see also CONST. OF
BOTS. Sept. 30, 1966, ch. IV, pt. I, § 41(1).
97. See Heyns & Kaguongo, supra note 36, at 715-17 (showing tables with the
number of rights protected under each national constitution). According to this
study, the fewest number of rights (ten in number) are recognized and protected
by the constitutions of Tunisia and Libya, while the highest number (twentyfive rights) are recognized and protected by the constitutions of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Uganda. See id. tbl.2.

1028

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

1990 constitutional changes on the quality of human rights
and freedoms enjoyed by Africans can be gleaned from the
following three tables:98
Table 1. General Freedom in Africa Trend for the Period
1980-1989
No. of Free
No. of Partly
No. of Not
Countries
Free
Free
Countries
Countries
1980
4
18
29
(7.8%)
(35.2%)
(56.8%)
1981
4
18
29
(7.8%)
(35.2%)
(56.8%)
1982
3
19
29
(5.8%)
(37.2%)
(56.8%)
1983
3
19
29
(5.8%)
(37.2%)
(56.8)%
1984
2
18
31
(3.9%)
(35.2%)
(60.7%)
1985
2
15
34
(3.9%)
(29.4%)
(66.6%)
1986
2
15
34
(3.9%)
(29.4%)
(66.6%)
1987
2
16
33
(3.9%)
(31.3%)
(64.7%)
1988
2
14
35
(3.9%)
(27.4%)
(68.6%)
1989
3
14
34
(5.8%)
(27.4%)
(66.6%)

98. The following tables are based on data compiled from Freedom House. See
Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data, FREEDOMHOUSE.ORG,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439 (last visited May 30,
2011); see also Fombad, Post-1990 Constitutional Reforms, supra note 3, at 187.
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Table 2. General Freedom in Africa trend for the period
1990-1999
No. of Free
No. of Partly
No. of Not
Countries
Free
Free
Countries
Countries
1990
4
18
30
(7.6%)
(34.6%)
(57.6%)
1991
7
23
22
(13.4%)
(44.2%)
(42.3%)
1992
8
25
19
(15.3%)
(48%)
(36.5%)
1993
8
17
28
(15%)
(32%)
(52.8%)
1994
9
18
26
(16.9%)
(33.9%)
(49%)
1995
9
20
24
(16.9%)
(37.7%)
(45.2%)
1996
9
20
24
(16.9%)
(37.7%)
(45.2%)
1997
9
20
24
(16.9%)
(37.7%)
(45.2%)
1998
9
21
23
(16.9%)
(39.6%)
(43.3%)
1999
9
25
19
(16.9%)
(47.1%)
(35.8%)
Table 3. General Freedom in Africa trend for the period
2001-2009
No. of Free
No. of Partly
No. of Not
Countries
Free
Free
Countries
Countries
200111
23
18
2002
(18%)
(46%)
(36%)
2003
11
23
19
(20.8%)
(43.4%)
(35.8%)
2004
11
24
18
(20.8%)
(45.3%)
(34%)
2005
11
22
20
(20.8%)
(41.5%)
(37.7%)

1030
2006
2007
2008
2009
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11
(20.8%)
11
(20.8%)
11
(20.8%)
10
(18.9%)

24
(45.3%)
23
(43.4%)
24
(45.3%)
24
(45.3%)

[Vol. 59
18
(34%)
19
(35.8%)
18
(34%)
19
(35.8%)

What these tables show is that there has been some
improvement in the quality of freedom enjoyed by Africans,
generally speaking. For the period 1980-1989, an average of
2.7 (5.2%) countries were classified as free, 16.6 (32.5%) as
partly free, and 31.7 (62.1%) were classified as not free. 99 By
contrast, for the period 1990-1999, the number of free
countries had almost trebled to 8.1 (15.2%), while the
number of partly free countries had increased to 20.7 (39%),
and there was a fairly significant drop in the number of
countries classified as not free, 23.9 (45%).100 Perhaps the
most interesting finding from the survey is that there are a
number of countries who throughout the entire period
studied have the dubious distinction of being classified as
not free. The nine countries in this category are Chad, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
Libya, Rwanda, Somalia, Cameroon, and Mauritania.101 By
contrast, Botswana is the only country that has been
classified as free throughout this period.102
Freedom House, in its 2009 report on the annual survey
of global political rights and civil liberties, noted that “2008
marked the third consecutive year in which global freedom
suffered a decline,” and pointed out that “this setback was
most pronounced in Sub-Saharan Africa and the non-Baltic

99. See supra tbl.1.
100. See supra tbl.2.
101. Freedom in the World Country Ratings, 1972-2011, FREEDOMHOUSE.ORG,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/fiw/historical/FIWAllScoresCountries
1973-2011.xls (last visited Aug. 3, 2011).
102. Id.
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former Soviet Union.”103 In its 2008 ranking of 150
countries, World Audit Democracy grouped each country
into one of four divisions based on their rank in democracy,
press freedom, and corruption.104 No African countries
appear in the first division, consisting of twenty-nine
countries, and only Mauritius appears in the second group
of eight countries in division two.105 A number of other
African countries, led by Botswana, South Africa, and
Namibia, appear in the third division, while the rest appear
in the fourth division.106
Considering the importance of a free media to nurturing
and sustaining democracy, the increasing threats to media
freedom pose other serious challenges to constitutionalism.
The much acclaimed record on democracy and good
governance of countries such as Botswana is under threat
today partly due to the existence of numerous media
unfriendly laws, many dating to the colonial period, which
are often used to hold the media in terrorem.107 Similarly,
the performances of countries such as Namibia and South
103. Freedom in the World 2009 Survey Release, FREEDOMHOUSE.ORG,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=445 (last visited May 30,
2011).
104. See World Audit Democracy, WORLDAUDIT.ORG (Nov. 2010), http://www.
worldaudit.org/democracy.htm.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See generally UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORG. ET
UNDUE RESTRICTION: LAWS IMPACTING ON MEDIA FREEDOM IN THE SADC 1532 (Badala Tachilisa Balule & Kaitira Kandjii comps., Raymond Louw ed., 2004)
[hereinafter UNDUE RESTRICTION] (outlining a number of laws restricting media
freedom that arguably violate Botswana‟s constitutional principles). The
situation in Botswana is changing very rapidly for the worse as a result of the
economic recession and a leadership change in April 2008. Demand for the
mainstay of the economy—diamonds—dropped, and having had one of the
highest growth rates in the world, the country suddenly had one of the lowest
growth rates in Africa in 2009. The accession to power of the former commander
of the armed forces and son of the first president, who has shown little respect
for democratic values and principles, has raised serious doubts about the future
of democracy in the country. Mpho G. Molomo, Democracy Under Siege: The
Presidency and Executive Powers in Botswana, 14 PULA: BOTSWANA J. AFR. STUD.
95, 100-07 (2000); Christian von Soest, Stagnation of a “Miracle:” Botswana‟s
Governance Record Revisited 10-12 (German Inst. of Global & Area Studs.,
Working Paper No. 99/2009), available at http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/
download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp99_soest.pdf.
AL.,
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Africa are adversely affected by the continued existence on
their statute books today of many laws impacting negatively
on the mass media that were enacted during the apartheid
period.108 A recent study of media unfriendly laws in nine
South African Development Community (“SADC”) countries
is particularly revealing as to the type of laws that are used
to restrict freedom of expression.109 According to this study,
Botswana has fifteen such media unfriendly laws,110 Lesotho
has nine,111 Malawi has eleven,112 Namibia has eight,113
South Africa has twelve,114 Swaziland has seventeen,115
Zambia has seven,116 and Zimbabwe has ten.117 Reporters
Without Borders, in their 2008 press freedom index
involving a survey of 173 countries, rank Eritrea, Africa‟s
youngest country, last, stating that it is run “like a vast
open prison.”118 The steady decline in the quality of human
rights enjoyed on the continent is evident not just from the
limited scope of the rights recognized and enforced but also
from the weak enforcement mechanisms in place.
An example of continuous human rights challenges is
the regular exploitation of ethnicity and ethnic parochialism
by opportunistic politicians. It is significant that in the
Heyns and Kaguongo study, only three countries out of the
fifty-three African countries whose constitutional provisions
108. See UNDUE RESTRICTION, supra note 107, at 53-63 (describing the current
state of laws restricting media freedom in Namibia and noting the impact of the
South African occupation of Namibia during the apartheid period on these
laws); id. at 65-78 (describing media laws in South Africa and stating that,
“[m]ost of the offensive laws are a legacy of apartheid media controls”).
109. See generally id.
110. Id. at 21-31.
111. Id. at 36-41.
112. Id. at 45-51.
113. Id. at 56-63.
114. Id. at 69-78.
115. Id. at 81-88.
116. Id. at 106-114.
117. Id. at 120-127. There are twenty-one such laws in Zambia. See MEDIA
INST. OF S. AFR., SOUTHERN AFRICAN MEDIA DIRECTORY 2006/7 126 (2007),
available at http://www.misa.org/researchandpublication/mediadirectory/mdire
ctory20067final.pdf.
118. Press Freedom Index 2008, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, http://en.rsf.
org/press-freedom-index-2008,33.html (last visited July 17, 2011).
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were examined contain provisions which recognize and
protect minority rights.119 In many complex multi-ethnic
countries such as Cameroon, Nigeria, Zambia, Malawi, Cote
d‟Ivoire, and Kenya, politicians have exploited ethnic
rivalries to fragment the opposition parties.120 Incumbents
might present themselves and their parties as the only
credible option for holding the country together while
presenting the opposition parties as divisive and
unpatriotic.121 In actively promoting division amongst
opposition parties in this manner, it becomes difficult to
build the foundation for tolerance and trust that is essential
in establishing viable democratic processes, institutions and
culture.122
Democratic progress will be easier in a situation where
the economy is healthy and flourishing and offers good
prospects for employment and improved quality of life. The
African economies have remained depressed, and health
shocks, such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic, have further
diminished the ability of many people to support
themselves, work, or even provide for their families.
“Hungry people have little interest in democracy, even if it
creates the environment for their survival.”123 Promises
made in the 1990s regarding food, water, shelter,
healthcare, employment, better wages, and increased
accountability have not been fulfilled.124 Instead, so-called
multi-party elections have been more frequent and more
expensive, offering better opportunities for self enrichment
for politicians and their cronies and “little benefit to the
ordinary voter.”125 Because the performance of the new
democrats has been so disappointing, “some cynics now feel

119. Heyns & Kaguongo, supra note 36, at 716.
120. Fombad, supra note 69, at 17; Julius O. Ihonvbere, Where is the Third
Wave? A Critical Evaluation of Africa‟s Non-Transition to Democracy, 43 AFR.
TODAY 343, 362 (1996).
121. Fombad, supra note 69, at 17-18.
122. Id. at 18.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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that the third wave is fast degenerating into a „third wail‟
for Africans.”126
In spite of the departure of Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya in
2002,127 there are other African monuments of
“standpattism,” as René Lemarchand describes them,128
such as Paul Biya of Cameroon, Teodoro Nguema Mbasogo
of Equatorial Guinea, Blaise Camporé of Burkina Faso, and
Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who are so deeply entrenched
that they cannot be easily removed through the ordinary
democratic process.129 With formidable foes of democracy
like this that have only grudgingly adopted some symbolic
features of democracy, it seems reasonable to conclude that
there is still a long way to go for constitutionalism to be
entrenched in Africa.

126. Id.; see Julius O. Ihonvbere, A Balance Sheet of Africa‟s Transition to
Democratic Governance, in THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN
AFRICA 33, 50 (John Mukum Mbaku & Julius Omozuanvbo Ihonvbere eds.,
2003).
127. He Wenping, Lessons to be Learnt from Kenya‟s “Democracy,” CHINA
DAILY,
Jan.
17,
2008,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/200801/17/
content_6400141.htm.
128. René Lemarchand, African Transitions to Democracy: An Interim (and
Mostly Pessimistic) Assessment, 22 AFR. INSIGHT 178, 181 (1992).
129. See List of African Dictators and Longest Serving Leaders, MYWEKU.COM
(Mar. 20, 2011), http://www.myweku.com/2011/03/list-of-african-dictators-andlongest-serving-leaders/, which indicates that the longest serving leaders are:
Moummar Gaddafi of Libya, forty-two years; Teodoro Ngueme Mbasogo of
Equitorial Guinea, thirty-two years; Jose Santos of Angola, thirty-two years;
Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, thirty-one years; Paul Biya of Cameroon, twentynine years; Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, twenty-five years; Blaise Campore of
Burkina Faso, twenty-four years; Mswati III of Swaziland, twenty-four years;
Omar Bashir of Sudan, twenty-one years; Idrissu Deby of Chad, twenty-one
years; Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea, eighteen years; Yahya Jammeh of Gambia,
seventeen years; Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, seventeen years; Pakalitha Mosisili
of Lesotho, thirteen years; Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti, twelve years;
Mohammed VI of Morocco, twelve years; Laurent Gbagbo of Cote d‟Ivoire, eleven
years; Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, eleven years; and Paul Kagame of Rwanda,
eleven years. According to East African Magazine, the five worst presidents are
Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea, Omar Bashir of Sudan, Teodoro Nguema Mbasogo of
Equitorial Guinea, Idrissu Deby of Chad, and Sheik Ahmed of Somalia. The
African President‟s Index: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, E. AFR. MAG., Dec.
27, 2010, at III.
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III. REFLECTIONS ON A CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AGENDA
FOR THE NEXT DECADE
The main focus of this Part is to consider what
institutional, structural, and other changes need to be made
to prevent the progress towards constitutionalism,
democracy, and good governance from being undermined by
unconstitutional means such as military and electoral coups
d‟états or by constitutional means such as abuse of executive
powers. From the nature of the challenges examined above,
it is clear that many of the constitutional reforms either did
not go far enough to address the real problems or were not
sufficiently robust to withstand the recovery of many
“standpattists” who, caught off guard in the 1990s, have
sufficiently weathered the storm of the third wave of
democratization and are now fast sailing towards the safe
waters of dictatorship.
It is contended that the prospects for constitutionalism,
democracy, and good governance will be considerably
enhanced if a number of reforms and other changes
suggested in this Article are implemented. These include
the recognition of a right to free and fair elections, the
constitutional entrenchment of key principles and
institutions of accountability, the reduction of presidential
powers, and a firm commitment to poverty reduction
through the incorporation of socio-economic rights. Present
and future constitutional reforms also require an ever
vigilant civil society and a judiciary firmly committed to
promoting constitutionalism. These and similar points are
some of the issues that should preoccupy the minds of
constitutional reformers in the next decade.
A. Recognition of a Right to Free and Fair Elections and
Other Ancillary Rights
The recognition of the right to form and/or join political
parties of one‟s choice and to vote or to be voted for any
political office in the post-1990 African constitutions is fast
becoming an illusion because the dominant parties that
have now replaced the single parties and their leaders have
easily entrenched themselves or their parties in office in
perpetuity.130 One of the major challenges that has emerged
130. For examples, see supra note 129.
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from the developments of the last decade is the problem of
countering the resurgence of majoritarian abuse or
dominant party dictatorships that use multi-partyism as a
convenient smokescreen behind which to practice their
dictatorship.131 Inevitably, this one party dominance, even in
countries such as Botswana and South Africa, which have
regularly been classified as the least corrupt countries in
Africa, has encouraged a culture of corruption, nepotism,
and patronage.132 This poses a serious problem to
entrenching constitutionalism and the rule of law on the
continent. The question, then, is: How can constitutionalism
“counter the risk of democratic majoritarianism descending
into the tyranny of the majority?”133 For better or worse,
Africa is doomed to democracy as the only viable framework
within which the political stability and economic
development needed to help the continent recover is
possible. It is submitted that one important way of reducing
the risks of fraudulent elections will be to recognize and
entrench a right to free and fair elections in the constitution
itself. This can be done in several ways.
First, constitutional provisions must recognize the basic
rights and duties of political parties.134 While political
parties will remain essentially private associations freely
created and run by the membership in pursuit of a political
goal, they are unlike all other private associations. Because
of the potentially wide-ranging reach of their activities in
the public domain they can no longer simply be allowed to
do their own things their own way. Instead,
“[c]onstitutionalizing their status necessarily means that
their actions will come under public scrutiny at all times,
not just during elections.”135 Under the traditional approach
to actions against political parties, the parties enjoyed a
high degree of immunity from actions by prior members
because their internal rules were considered analogous to
those of an unincorporated non-profit society.136 Therefore,
131. Fombad, Challenges, supra note 3, at 5.
132. See infra Part III.B.
133. Fombad, Challenges, supra note 3, at 5.
134. The rationale and the mechanism for this approach are fully developed in
Fombad, Challenges, supra note 3.
135. Fombad, Challenges, supra note 3, at 39.
136. Id.
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the rules were considered unenforceable as a contract.137
However, this traditional approach should have no place in
the modern constitutional approach.138 Perhaps one of the
most important advantages of constitutionalizing the rights
and duties of political parties is that it will promote internal
democracy139 and “ensure that personal actions can be
brought against political parties which break their own
rules, as they are often apt to do, when they find this
politically
expedient.”140
Furthermore,
constitutional
provisions should lay down basic principles for elections
within all political parties to ensure that persons with
criminal records or who are subject to the legal process are
barred from seeking or holding political office.
Second, constitutional provisions should guarantee a
right to free and fair elections and a right to equality of
treatment of all political parties. Based on this, all pieces of
legislation dealing with electoral matters and processes
should only be considered valid if they conform to a number
of principles, namely:141
(i)
When the legislation does not hinder the exercise
of political rights in a free and fair manner;
(ii) When the legislation does not negate the essential
content of the exercise of political rights;

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Internal democracy has often been a problem due to what political
scientist Robert Michels has referred to as the “iron law of oligarchy,” in which
”parties tend to centrali[z]e powers around ruling elites (or a leader) that then
dispense patronage to loyal followers.” Anthony Egan, „Coming to the Party‟: The
Problem of Party Politics for Democracy, in DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: PROMOTING
THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON DEMOCRACY, ELECTIONS AND GOVERNANCE 10, 10
(Douglas Racionzer ed., 2009). The rulers then manipulate compliant masses by
popular demagoguery to stay in power and fend off any actual or potential
challengers. See id. at 10-11.
140. Fombad, Challenges, supra note 3, at 39. It should be noted that this
analysis “in no way underestimates the value of using the sometimes quite
sophisticated internal rules for settling disputes that are found in the
constitutions and rule books of political parties.” Id. However, there is a
potential for abuse and delay of these processes. Id.
141. These considerations are discussed further in Fombad, Challenges, supra
note 3, at 42, where they are described as “imperative” tests.
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(iii)

When the legislation is acceptable and
demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic
society. In determining this, the benefits of the
legislation in a democratic society, taking into
account the purposes and values of the
constitution, must be seen to outweigh the
detriment it may cause;
(iv) When the legislation protects the interests of
minorities and indigenous people in a fair and
reasonable manner taking into account all the
circumstances; and,
(v) Where there are restrictions, it must be
determined whether:
(a) the objectives of the restrictions are
sufficiently important to justify limiting the
exercise of political rights in the manner
contemplated;
(b) the measures are designed to meet the
objective rationally connected to it; and
(c) the measures provided do no more than is
reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate
objective.
While the constitutions of a few African countries
contain provisions which try to recognize and protect the
rights of political parties and shield them from some of the
excesses of ruling parties determined to maintain their
dominant positions, these are usually not sufficiently
comprehensive or clear. An example of this is found in
articles 71 and 72 of the Ugandan Constitution, which lays
down the principles that “the multi-party political system
shall conform to.”142 Although this has not always been
respected, in Rwanyarare v. Attorney General143 the
Ugandan Constitutional Court struck down a number of
provisions in the Political Parties and Organisations Act of
2002 on the grounds that they violated the constitutional
principles of multi-party democracy and were a

142. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA Oct. 8, 1995, arts. 71-72. For
similar provisions, see CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA Apr. 28, 1992,
art. 55, and S. AFR. CONST., 1996 art. 19.
143. 2004 AHRLR 279 (CC) (Uganda).
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“monstrosity in a free and democratic society.”144 A similar
outcome could be achieved by invoking other provisions in
the constitution,145 but as we shall soon see, the
effectiveness of constitutional provisions recognizing the
rights of political parties will depend on the attitude of the
judges.146
One important lesson from the pre-1990 era is that
strong, active, and disciplined political parties, not just one
political party, are necessary for any effective political
representation and genuine democracy to take hold.
However, merely opening up political space for other parties
to participate is not enough. Multi-partyism will only be
effective and meaningful when there are adequate rules in
place to give every party a chance to compete fairly and
equally so that no party is allowed to abuse its incumbency
in order to perpetuate itself in power. Although
constitutionalism is not necessarily synonymous with
democracy or constitutional democracy, the latter two
considerably enhance the prospects for constitutionalism
and will render the latter an illusion in their absence. 147 Be
that as it may, the core elements of constitutionalism that
have now been accepted in Africa need to be reinforced by
certain key principles and institutions of accountability.
B. The Constitutional Entrenchment of Key Principles and
Institutions of Accountability
Many post-1990 African constitutions do make
reference directly or indirectly to and provide for some
accountability
and
transparency
measures
and
mechanisms.148 In many situations, these measures and
mechanisms have been introduced through ordinary
144. Id. at 289.
145. In the Zimbabwean case of United Parties v. Minister of Justice 1998 (2)
BCLR 224 (SC) (Zim.), the Supreme Court struck down legislation stating that
parties with fewer than fifteen members in parliament were not entitled to state
funding. The Court held that the funding system, because it set the threshold
too high, violated the political parties‟ freedom of expression. Id. at 234-39.
146. See infra Part III.E.3.
147. For further discussion on the relationship between constitutionalism and
democracy see supra note 18.
148. See supra note 58.
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legislation. These have often not worked well, mainly
because the legal safeguards to protect them from being
abused or manipulated by the governments are either weak
or more often absent. For example, the ombudsman and
anti-corruption institutions have now generally been
accepted in Africa as essential components of good
governance and accountability. Many recent constitutions
or, more often, legislation, provide for them in one form or
another.149 However, in many instances, institutions such as
the Botswana Ombudsmen have ended up “like a prize
champion fighting with his hands tied behind his back.”150
While the absence of sufficient accountability measures and
mechanisms remains a fundamental problem, in some cases
even where they exist they are unable to operate effectively
to check governmental abuses. It seems that the tenacity of
the one party mentality within the new dominant parties,
coupled with weak and ineffective civil societies in many
African countries, has been a formidable obstacle in holding
governments to account.
As indicated earlier, Chapter 9 of the South African
Constitution creates a phalanx of institutions to uphold
constitutional democracy and promote accountability.151 The
mere listing of these institutions on their own is not novel,
for many constitutions do provide for some of them. What is
perhaps unique about the South African approach is that
there are four legal principles that are spelled out to ensure
that these institutions are effective, rather than a political
charade of symbolic value only. The four guiding principles
provide that:
(i)
“These institutions are independent, and subject
only to the Constitution and the law, and they
must be impartial and must exercise their
powers and perform their functions without fear,
favour or prejudice.”152

149. See, e.g., supra note 58.
150. Charles Manga Fombad, The Enhancement of Good Governance in
Botswana: A Critical Assessment of the Ombudsman Act, 27 J. S. AFR. STUD. 57,
77 (2001); see id. at 76-77 for the history and context of the role of the
Ombudsman in Botswana.
151. See supra Part I; see also S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 9.
152. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 9, § 181(2).
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(ii)

“Other organs of state, through legislative and
other measures, must assist and protect these
institutions to ensure the independence,
impartiality, dignity and effectiveness of these
institutions.”153
(iii) “No person or organ of state may interfere with
the functioning of these institutions.”154
(iv) “These institutions are accountable to the
National Assembly, and must report on their
activities and the performance of their functions
to the Assembly at least once a year.”155
Something close to these principles are referred to in
some constitutions as “directive principles of state policy,”156
but these, unlike the principles in the South African
Constitution, are stated in purely hortatory terms. The six
institutions provided for under the South African
Constitution are: (i) the Public Protector (commonly
referred to elsewhere as the ombudsman); (ii) the Human
Rights Commission; (iii) the Commission for the Promotion
and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and
Linguistic Communities; (iv) the Commission for Gender
Equality; (v) the Auditor-General; and (vi) the Electoral
Commission.157
The effectiveness of the four guiding principles in
protecting the South African Chapter 9 institutions from
political interference can be illustrated with three cases
decided by the South African Constitutional Court, all
involving the South African Independent Electoral
Commission (“IEC”).158 In the first case, Independent
Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality,159 the
Court pointed out that because the independence and
153. Id. § 181(3).
154. Id. § 181(4).
155. Id. § 181(5).
156. See e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA Apr. 28, 1992, arts. 3441; CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA May 29, 1999, §§ 13-24.
157. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch.9, § 181(1)(a).
158. For a further discussion of these cases, see Fombad, Challenges, supra
note 3, at 29-30.
159. 2001 (9) BCLR 883 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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impartiality of the IEC is guaranteed in the constitution,160
Parliament is under a duty not to compromise the
independence and impartiality of the IEC when adopting
legislation to regulate its activities.161 The Court made it
clear that any such legislation is subject to judicial review to
ensure its conformity to the constitution.162 Without these
constitutionally guaranteed principles, the Court would
have had no basis to review any legislation dealing with the
IEC to make sure that it is not biased in favor of the ruling
ANC party.
The second case, New National Party of South Africa v.
Government of the Republic of South Africa,163 also raised
the question of the independence of the IEC and the
possibility of governmental interference with its
functioning.164 On the facts, the Court came to the
conclusion that there was no evidence that the Government
had actually interfered with the IEC. Nevertheless, the
Court underscored the fact that the IEC, like other Chapter
9 institutions, was the product of what it termed a “new
constitutionalism” whose independence had to be jealously
preserved and protected.165 The Court went further to
emphasize two features which it felt were critical to the
institution‟s independence. First, financial independence,
which meant that the IEC should be given enough funds to
enable it discharge its functions.166 Such independence
required that the funding should come not from
Government, but rather from parliament. In deciding on the
funding level, the IEC had to be “afforded an adequate
opportunity to defend its budgetary requirements before
Parliament and its relevant committees.”167 Second, the
IEC‟s
independence
also
implies
administrative
independence which made it subject only to the constitution
160. Id. at 895; see also S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 9, § 181(2) (“These [Chapter 9]
institutions are independent, and subject only to the Constitution and the law,
and they must be impartial . . . .”).
161. Id. at 897.
162. Id.
163. 1999 (3) SA 191 (CC) (S. Afr.).
164. See id. at 224.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 231.
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and the law. It also meant that the IEC was answerable in
the way that it performed its functions only to Parliament
rather than the executive.168
In the third case, August v. Electoral Commission,169 the
IEC had refused to make special arrangements to enable
prisoners to register for elections.170 They argued that it was
going to be too expensive and would be administratively and
logistically difficult to do.171 The applicants, a prisoner and a
prisoner awaiting trial, were unsuccessful in their
application before the Transvaal High Court, which agreed
with the arguments put forward by the IEC as justification
for refusing to register the prisoners.172 When the matter
came before the Constitutional Court on appeal, the Court
rejected the reasons advanced by the IEC. The Court
pointed out that since the Constitution did not have any
provision which authorized Parliament to enact legislation
disqualifying any group of people from voting, and
Parliament had not made such legislation, the IEC was
wrong to make an administrative decision which had the
effect of disenfranchising a certain category of voters.173 The
Court declared that this was a violation of the political
rights guaranteed in section 19 of the constitution.174 It felt
that the constitution imposed a positive duty on the IEC to
take all reasonable steps to enable eligible persons to
register and exercise their right to vote.175
By way of contrast, the South African Constitution also
provides for the establishment of a National Prosecuting
Authority (“NPA”).176 The NPA, however, is not one of the
Chapter 9 institutions that have been carefully protected
from political interference. Although section 179(4) of the
Constitution says that “national legislation must ensure
that the prosecuting authority exercises its functions
168. Id.
169. 1999 (4) BCLR 363 (CC) (S. Afr.).
170. Id. at 370-71.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 368-69.
173. Id. at 373.
174. Id. at 374.
175. Id. at 372, 374.
176. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 8, § 179.
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without fear, favour or prejudice,”177 the ability of the courts
to intervene and prevent interference with the NPA is
limited by section 179(5)(a), which states that the National
Director of Public Prosecutions “must determine, with the
concurrence of the Cabinet member responsible for the
administration of justice, and after consulting the Directors
of Public Prosecutions, prosecution policy, which must be
observed in the prosecution process.”178 Because of this weak
constitutional foundation, there has been frequent
interference in the work of the NPA. For instance, at its
2007 Polokwane conference, the ruling African National
Congress (“ANC”) passed a resolution to dissolve the NPA‟s
Directorate of Special Operations, popularly known as the
Scorpions.179 The resolution was deliberately designed to
purge this independent unit of crime and corruption fighters
who had been very successful in their campaign against
corruption and racketeering against people in high places,
including many prominent politicians.180 Legislation to
dissolve the Scorpions was easily approved by Parliament.181
177. Id. § 179(4).
178. Id. § 179(5)(a).
179. African National Congress [ANC], 52d National Conference: Resolutions
(Dec. 20, 2007), available at http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=2536.
180. David Bruce, Without Fear or Favour: The Scorpions and the Politics of
Justice, SA CRIME Q. June 2008, at 11, 13 (“Rather than engaging in a process of
self-reflection and self-criticism (something which is said to be one of the
strengths of the ANC) the party chose to blame the Scorpions for the fact that
several of its members had been implicated in corruption.”).
181. The National Prosecuting Authority Amendment Act and the South
African Police Service Amendment Act were passed by Parliament on October 3,
2008. See Glenister v. President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 (3) SA 347
(CC) at paras. 1, 12 (S. Afr.) (Ngcobo, C.J., dissenting). However, in Glenister the
Constitutional Court, by a majority of five to four, declared that the legislation
that introduced the new corruption fighting body that replaced the Scorpions
with the Hawks was inconsistent with the constitution and invalid to the extent
that it failed to secure an adequate degree of independence for the corruptionfighting unit that it sought to establish. Id. at paras. 197-98, 208 (Moseneke,
D.C.J. & Cameron, J., majority opinion). Although there was no specific
provision in the Constitution specifying that the unit must be independent, the
majority held that the constitutional obligation to set up an independent
corruption-fighting unit could be inferred from the duty imposed by section 7(2)
of the constitution to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil” the rights in the Bill
of Rights. Id. at para. 177. It went further to point out that based on section
39(1)(b) of the constitution, which required the Court in interpreting the Bill of
Rights to consider international law, and section 231, which states that all
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The weaknesses of the NPA were further underscored
when its director was suspended, and later dismissed,
because, as one critic put it, he took “his responsibility to act
without „fear, favour or prejudice‟ too seriously for those
who would prefer to have a less independent person in his
office.”182
It is therefore clear that in spite of its solid constitution,
there are still weaknesses in the South African
constitutional framework. In fact, because of the political
turmoil of the last two years that led to the election of Jacob
Zuma as President of the ANC, many of the Chapter 9
institutions, especially the Public Protector and the Human
Rights Commission, have come under pressure.183 The ad
hoc Committee on the Review of Chapter 9 and Associated
Institutions was established in 2006, under Chairperson
Kader Asmal, to examine the effectiveness and efficiency of
these institutions.184 The Committee recommended that
some of them, such as the Commission for the Protection of
Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, be
incorporated under the aegis of the Human Rights
Commission.185
Be that as it may, two main lessons can be learned from
the example of South Africa with respect to the best way to
make these accountability institutions effective and shield
them from political manipulation by the opportunistic
dominant parties of today. First, the basic structure of the
institution, as well as its composition and powers, must be
laid down in the constitution. Second, there must be clearly
international agreements approved by Parliament are binding, the
establishment of a corruption-fighting unit ignoring binding international
instruments which required such a unit to be independent was not a reasonable
constitutional measure. Id. at paras. 192, 194.
182. Paul Hoffman, Democracy and Accountability: Balancing Majority Rule
and Minority Rights 5 (S. Afr. Inst. of Int‟l Affairs, Occasional Paper No. 27),
available at http://www.ifaisa.org/current_affairs/Balancing_Majority_Rule_and
_Minority_Rights.pdf.
183. See id. at 5-6.
184. PARLIAMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, REPORT OF THE AD HOC
COMMITTEE ON THE REVIEW OF CHAPTER 9 AND ASSOCIATED INSTITUTIONS 4-5
(2007), available at http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/Reports/Report%
20of%20the%20Ad%20Hoc%20Committee%20of%20chapter%209.%202007.pdf.
185. Id. at xii.
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defined legal principles to limit the ability of governments
to interfere with their operations.
Traditional constitutionalism, in the form in which it
has been incorporated in modern African constitutions, has
rightly been criticized as being “a largely procedural notion”
because it emphasizes values while paying little attention to
the principles, structures, and institutions that will enable
these values to achieve concrete practical results.186 For
example, it is submitted that these constitutions have not
adequately addressed the root causes of the social and
economic problems that continue to make the poor even
poorer after the 1990 reforms. Some of these problems can
be addressed by the constitutionalization of strong and
independent institutions of accountability. In this regard, it
seems that a number of institutions of oversight, either of a
general nature or of specific branches of the government,
have become a necessity in any constitutional design that
aspires
to
promote
both
constitutionalism
and
accountability. These are:
(i)
the ombudsman;
(ii) a human rights commission;
(iii) a public accounts committee;
(iv) an Auditor-General offices;
(v) an access to information commission;
(vi) a media commission;
(vii) an independent prosecuting authority;
(viii) an anti-corruption agency;
(ix) a judicial service commission;
(x) a minority rights commission;
(xi) an independent electoral commission; and
(xii) an electoral boundaries commission.
These institutions on their own cannot achieve much
unless there is the political will to make them work and the
necessary legal safeguards to protect them from political
interference. In addition to the four constitutional principles

186. Carla M. Zoethout & Piet J. Boon, Defining Constitutionalism and
Democracy: An Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA: A QUEST FOR
AUTOCHTHONOUS PRINCIPLES 1, 1-2 (Carla M. Zoethout et al. eds., 1996).
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that govern the South African Chapter 9 institutions,187 the
constitution must also define their structure, functions, and
composition in a manner that will ensure that none of the
three organs of government can interfere with their
operations.188 Perhaps the main safeguard against any
abuse would be a general limitation clause which provides
that any legislation or mechanism introduced to regulate
any of these institutions, and which undermines the
essential purpose of accountability and transparency that
the institution is designed to achieve, must be declared null
and void by the courts.
Two important conclusions can be drawn from the
experiences of the South African Chapter 9 institutions.
First, that these institutions will be more effective if they
are made easily accessible to the poor and marginalized in
society. For instance, ombudsmen and anti-corruption
institutions should be decentralized and have offices in as
many districts as possible and not merely in the capital city.
Second, they must be given powers to be both reactive and
proactive. These institutions can only be credible if they
provide what has been described as “low” constitutionalism,
which addresses “the rampant impunity and abuse of power
by officials at the most basic level of the public
administration,” as opposed to “high” constitutionalism that
addresses the concerns of the elites.189 They will need to deal
with the pervasive and perennial abuses of discretionary
powers involving unjustified discrimination and extortion of
money which a majority of Africans are subjected to on a
daily basis, for example, the extraction of bribes by police
187. See supra text accompanying notes 152-22.
188. In spite of the commendable attempt to limit political interference, the
South African Chapter 9 institutions have been criticized for this very reason.
The Human Rights Institute of South Africa (“HURISA”) has concluded that
“the majority of people believe the Public Protector to be either ineffective or
obedient to the interests of the African National Congress.” Butjwana Seokoma,
Do or Die for Chapter 9 Institutions, NGO PULSE (June 18, 2008. 12:28 PM),
http://www.ngopulse.org/article/do-or-die-chapter-9-institutions. It went further
to state that “it is worrying that there is a culture of absolving any wrongdoing,
especially in cases such as the arms deal, the Oilgate scandal, as well as
Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka‟s controversial trip to the United Arab Emirates in
2005.” Id.
189. Prempeh, supra note 35, at 500. Prempeh refers to high constitutionalism
as “wholesale” constitutionalism and low constitutionalism as “retail”
constitutionalism. Id.
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officers at road blocks and the bribes extracted by civil
servants in order to process official documents.
However, in order to ensure that the institutions of
accountability are not only proactive and reactive but are
also able to tackle both petty and grand corruption there is
need for the constitution to lay down the basic principles for
effective whistleblower legislation190 and legislation
requiring mandatory declaration of assets for all political
office holders and senior public officers. The whistleblower
provision should require that legislation should, inter alia,
provide incentives for citizens to freely disclose information
on corrupt or improper conduct and prohibit retribution
against those who make such disclosures. There should also
be waivers from criminal and civil penalties for those who
disclose secret information. Such legislation should impose
penalties on those who harass whistleblowers. Many
countries, such as South Africa, have introduced codes of
ethics or legislation that requires all political office holders
to declare their assets.191 Unfortunately, in most cases the
legislation is weak, or, as in the case of South Africa, the
codes of ethics are not legally enforceable and therefore fail
to check against any abuses.192 The basic principles
190. In 2010, the Ugandan Parliament approved a comprehensive
whistleblowers bill with the expressed intent to “provide for the procedures by
which individuals in both the private and public sector may in the public
interest disclose information that relates to irregular, illegal, and corrupt
practices . . . .” Whistleblowers Protection Act, 2010 (Uganda). Uganda is the
third African country with such legislation. South Africa regulates
whistleblowing under the Protected Disclosures Act, which has the similar
expressed purpose of providing procedures by which “employees in both the
public and private sector may disclose information regarding irregular or
unlawful conduct by their employers . . . .” Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000
(S. Afr.).
191. See Executive Members‟ Ethics Act 82 of 1998 (S. Afr.), proclaiming that
the President must publish a code of ethics. Id. at § 2(1). The Act notes further
that this code of ethics may require officials to disclose all of their assets prior to
and during the assumption of office. Id. at §§ 2(3)(a)(i), (ii). The Code of Conduct
for the Parliament of South Africa does in fact provide that members must
disclose information including “shares and financial interests” and
“remuneration outside Parliament.” Code of Conduct, PARLIAMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA, http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?
Item_ID=139 (last visited Aug. 1, 2011).
192. In South Africa, the Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament and the
Executive Members‟ Ethics Act require members of parliament, ministers and
deputy ministers as well as the president to disclose details of their financial
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requiring strict declaration of assets by all office holders
with sanctions such as removal from office for noncompliance will go a long way to control the rising political
corruption that is fast undermining the fragile democratic
transition in Africa, even in countries such as Botswana and
South Africa193 that have regularly been classified by
interests, assets and gifts received. See supra note 191. In spite of this,
President Zuma only complied with this requirement some eight months after
the sixty day deadline stipulated in the Executive Members‟ Ethics Act and
after considerable public pressure. See Zuma Declares Interests, TIMES (South
Africa), Mar. 10, 2010, www.timeslive.co.za/local/article348521.ece/Zumadeclares-interests. By way of contrast, article 66 of the Cameroon Constitution
provides:
The President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, Members of
Government and persons ranking as such, the President and Members
of the Bureau of the National Assembly, the President and Members of
the Bureau of the Senate, Members of Parliament, Senators, all holders
of an elective office, Secretaries-General of Ministries and persons
ranking as such, Directors of the Central Administration, General
Managers of public and semi-public enterprises, Judicial and Legal
Officers, administrative personnel in charge of the tax base, collection
and handling of public funds, all managers of public votes and property,
shall declare their assets and property at the beginning and at the end
of their tenure of office.
CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON June 2, 1972, art. 66. This has never
been done since this constitution came into force in 1996.
193. For example, the ANC‟s business arm, Chancellor House, as a 25%
shareholder in Hitachi South Africa, stood to gain about 9.625 billion rand
because of its stake in the company from a contract that the government
awarded to Eskom, the national electricity supplier. Justin Brown, Inside
Resources: ANC Must Exit Hitachi to Fulfil its Manifesto, BUSINESS REPORT
(Mar. 17, 2010, 8:57 PM), http://www.iol.co.za/business/opinion/inside-resourcesanc-must-exit-hitachi-to-fulfil-its-manifesto-1.697119. In 2009, the former
Public Protector, Lawrence Mushwana, concluded that the then-Eskom
chairman and ANC executive committee member had “acted improperly in the
award of the contract to Hitachi SA.” Id.
Similarly, Wendy Jasson da Costa reported that “[t]he chairperson of the
ANC‟s biggest and most influential region in KwaZulu-Natal, John Mchunu, has
been awarded tenders worth at least [40 million rand] by the eThekwini
municipality.” Wendy Jasson da Costa, ANC Chief‟s Fat-Cat Deals, IOL NEWS
(Mar. 12, 2010, 7:19 AM), http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/anc-chief-s-fat-catdeals-1.476123.
Finally, after allegations that several prominent members of the ANC
and its youth wing had enriched themselves through the regular awarding of
government contracts to companies that they owned, calls for lifestyle audits,
which were termed a “smokescreen” masking “racist narratives,” were rejected
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Transparency International as the least corrupt countries
on the continent.194
C. Reduction of Excessive Presidential Powers
Recent events have shown that the abuse of exorbitant
power through reliance on presidential and executive
immunities and privileges is not unique to Africa;195
however, the effects of such abuses are usually more
deleterious on African states. It must now be recognized
that one of the major threats to constitutionalism in Africa
that has been little affected by the 1990 constitutional
reforms is the capacity for executive lawlessness, which has
been made possible by the excessive powers conferred on
presidents and the absence of any effective checks on the
exercise of these powers. In general, while the president in
each country must remain the sole repository of executive
power to ensure that there is no confusion as to who bears
ultimate responsibility for executive decisions,196 the
by the government. BMF: Calls for Lifestyle Audits Mask „Racist Narrative,‟
MAIL & GUARDIAN (Johannesburg), Mar. 23, 2010, http://www.mg.co.za/
article/2010-03-23-bmf-calls-for-lifestyle-audits-mask-racist-narrative
[hereinafter Lifestyle Audits].
194. The 2009 survey shows that Botswana ranked thirty-seventh in the world
and remains the least corrupt country in Africa, while South Africa ranked fiftyfifth in the world and is the fifth least corrupt country in Africa. See Corruption
Perceptions Index 2009, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, http://www.
transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table (last
visited July 17, 2011).
195. See Silvio Berlusconi‟s Troubles: Justice Can be Ever so Inconvenient,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 10, 2009, at 53. On October 7, 2009, the Italian Constitutional
Court declared an immunity law that would have protected the Prime Minister,
President, and speakers of both houses of parliament unconstitutional. Id.
Although a similar law had been rejected in 2004, Berlusconi still managed to
govern Italy for two years after the decision. Id. On October 30, 2009, former
French president Jacques Chirac was ordered to stand trial at the criminal
court for complicity in “breach of trust and unlawful use of public funds.” Chen
Li & Zhang Xin, Jacques Chirac‟s Trial a Test on French Judicial Reform, CHINA
VIEW (Nov. 6, 2009, 13:27), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-11/06/
content_12399263.htm. The trial marked “the first time in the history of the
fifth Republic of France that a retired president was prosecuted at a criminal
court.” Id. If Chirac is found guilty, he faces “up to 10 years in prison and a fine
of 150,000 euros.” Id.
196. The rationale for vesting executive power in one individual is
understandable—the need for accountability, speed, and decisiveness in
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impunity with which many presidents operate must be
limited by adequate checks and balances. The excessive
powers, which most presidents have been vested with or
have been allowed to claim for themselves through
sloppiness in constitutional design, can be curbed in a
number of ways.
First, specific criteria must be laid down to ensure that
all presidential appointments, especially for senior positions
in the military, the public service, and the judiciary, are
informed by clearly defined objective criteria based on
experience, expertise, and qualifications which limit the
scope for partisan political considerations. In particular,
there is a need to ensure that commissions making the
necessary recommendations for appointments, such as the
Higher Council of Magistracy (in Francophone countries) or
the Judicial Service Commission (in Anglophone countries),
are genuinely independent and that those appointed
directly or indirectly by the Government should never make
up more than one-third of the membership. Thus, although
the appointments are made by the Government, the
appointment process must be such that merit rather than
political considerations should be the decisive factor.
Second, there is a need to fundamentally restructure
the modern state to reduce the excessive concentration of
powers that has led to “imperial” presidents operating from
state capitals where too much power and decision-making
has also been concentrated. To enhance the quality and
practice of democracy and accountability, as well as
recognize cultural and ethnic diversity and also promote
equal and equitable development, it is submitted that there
is a need in many countries for devolution or
decentralization of power in order to establish new centers
of authority and policy-making. The need to enable people
decision-making. In commenting with respect to a similar position under the
U.S. Constitution, Justice Breyer of the U.S. Supreme Court said:
The Founders created this equivalence by consciously deciding to vest
Executive authority in one person rather than several. They did so in
order to focus, rather than to spread, Executive responsibility thereby
facilitating accountability. They also sought to encourage energetic,
vigorous, decisive, and speedy execution of the laws by placing in the
hands of a single, constitutionally indispensable, individual the
ultimate authority . . . .
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 712 (1997).
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today to have a greater say in the running of their daily
lives cannot be gainsaid, but the exact form that the
devolution should take will depend on the complexity of the
society. For example, this requires more effective steps
towards the decentralization of powers through federal
systems in certain complex multiethnic societies such as
Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, and South Africa. On the other
hand, Francophone Africa will need to overcome the Gallic
obsession with centralization of powers, especially to defuse
regional tensions in countries such as Senegal, Cameroon,197
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. What is actually
needed is effective local government and not merely local
administration, which is what is provided for under many of
the present unitary and highly centralized constitutional
structures.
Third, term prolongations do not only threaten the
budding seeds of democracy and constitutionalism but often
drive presidents to extremes such as murdering political
opponents who threaten their positions or siphoning state
funds to buy political support.198 No leader, however
virtuous or exceptional he may be, is indispensable and
irreplaceable.199 In fact, “[t]wo terms are long enough for any
exceptional leader to leave indelible footprints without
sowing the seeds of dictatorship. It is a period which is
sufficient to give a good leader time to leave his mark and
short enough for people to tolerate a poor leader.” 200
197. See generally Charles Manga Fombad, Cameroon‟s Constitutional
Conundrum: Reconciling Unity with Diversity, in ETHNICITY , HUMAN RIGHTS
AND C ONSTITUTIONALISM IN AFRICA 121 (2008) (noting increasing amounts of
tension along regional ethnic lines throughout Cameroon).
198. Fombad & Inegbedion, supra note 88, at 8-14.
199. Versions of Louis XIV of France‟s claim of imminent apocalypse, “après
moi, le déluge,” (literally, after me the deluge), has been expressed by many
different African leaders to create a myth of indispensability and
irreplaceability, with the possibility of dire consequences following their
departure from power. See Ndiva Kofele Kale, Keynote Address at Africa at
Crossroads: Complex Political Emergencies in the 21st Century: The Sovereign
African State is Dead . . . Long Live the State! Reflections on the „Collapsed
State‟ Debate (Mar. 21-23, 2001), available at http://www.ethnonetafrica.org/pubs/crossroadskale.htm (noting that “sans moi, le déluge” is the
African version of “après moi, le déluge”); see also Fombad & Inegbedion, supra
note 88, at 15-16.
200. Fombad & Inegbedion, supra note 88, at 28.
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Presidential term limits were one of the major
innovations in the post-1990 period and became a standard
provision in most African constitutions.201 These term limit
provisions brought an end to the long reign of rulers like
Jerry Rawlings of Ghana and Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya.202
Others, such as Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, Bakili Muluzi
of Malawi, and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, failed in their
attempts to amend term limits provisions to extend their
tenure.203 However, the last few years have seen a reversal
with many rulers, such as Paul Biya of Cameroon, who has
been in power for twenty-nine years, and Yoweri Museveni
of Uganda, who has ruled for twenty-five years, amending
their constitutions to extend their terms.204
It is submitted that there is a need to constitutionalize a
two term limit in African constitutions in a manner that
will make them more effective and less vulnerable to
arbitrary amendments.205 In doing so, these provisions must
also contain protective measures to accommodate the
sometimes well founded fears that incumbents may harbor.
In the past, African leaders have not only been killed or
imprisoned, but even some of the few who retired
voluntarily
suffered persecutions,
vilification,
and
humiliation.206 Recent African history has shown that the
201. See id. at 17-18.
202. Larry Diamond, The Rule of Law Versus the Big Man, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr.
2008, at 138, 140.
203. Fombad & Inegbedion, supra note 88, at 7.
204. More recently, former president Mamadou Tandja of Niger tried but failed
to pressure Parliament to amend the Nigerian Constitution in order to secure a
third term in office. He then proceeded to organize a referendum through which
the term limit was removed. See Kathryn Sturman, Niger: Who Needs
Presidential Term Limits?, ALLAFRICA.COM (Aug. 17, 2009), http://allafrica.com/
stories/200908170007.html. As a direct result of the political crisis that this
provoked, he was overthrown in a military coup in February 2010.
205. For a detailed discussion of the need for term limits in African
constitutions, see Fombad & Inegbedion, supra note 88.
206. The best example of this is the late Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon, who
voluntarily resigned as president of Cameroon in 1982. In 1983, his successor
accused him of complicity in a coup d‟etat. He was tried in abstentia and
sentenced to death in 1984. He died in exile in Senegal in 1989, a broken man.
Glenn Fowler, Obituary, Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon Dies; Ex-Leader was 65,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/02/obituaries/
ahmadou-ahidjo-of-cameroon-dies-ex-leader-was-65.html.
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fear of political persecution of former leaders does not
always come from the opposition parties.207 To encourage
incumbents to retire without fear of an uncertain future,
term limits provisions must in addition provide both
protective immunities and financial incentives. The
protective immunities should protect them from politically
motivated prosecutions but not from criminal responsibility,
especially for mala in se offenses.208 Generally, it is
necessary to make a distinction between brutal and corrupt
dictators, like Chiluba,209 who must be held accountable for
their actions, and “benign, naïve and misguided dictators,”
like Kenneth Kaunda, who “ought to enjoy immunity from
prosecution,”210 at least in respect of offenses that are not
morally reprehensible or contrary to basic international
207. For a further discussion of political persecution of leaders, see Fombad &
Inegbedion, supra note 88.
208. These are offenses that are inherently immoral such as unlawful
homicide, arson, or rape, which are prohibited by statute. Offenses created
under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, such as genocide
and crimes against humanity, will also fall under this category. Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court art. 5, adopted July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
209. In fact, in 2007 a British court found Chiluba guilty of stealing
government funds of $46 million and ordered him to repay 85% of the entire
sum. See Former President Frederick Chiluba Acquitted of Corruption Charges,
ZAMBIA EMBASSY, http://zambiaembassy.se/documents/Microsoft%20Word%20
%20Other%20News.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2011). The judge noted that “while
the former president had officially earned a total salary of just $105,000 over his
ten years in office, he had managed to pay an exclusive tailor‟s shop in Geneva
$1.2 million,” all of which had been stolen from the state. Raphael G. Satter,
Court: Ex-Zambian Leader Stole Millions, AP NEWS (May 5, 2007), available at
http://www.bookrags.com/news/court-ex-zambian-leader-stole-moc/. In response,
Chiluba described the judgment as “border[ing] on racism” and said he was the
“victim of a witch hunt by Mwanawasa” for stealing money, part of which was
given to him in the form of “gifts and donations.” Zambia‟s Chiluba Rubbishes
Court Ruling, IOL NEWS, (May 10, 2007, 2:50 PM), http://www.iol.co.za/
news/africa/zambia-s-chiluba-rubbishes-court-ruling-1.352442. It is worth
noting that the Zambian government decided to pursue the case “in a British
court, rather than at home, because much of the stolen money was laundered
through London.” Satter, supra.
210. Fombad & Inegbedion, supra note 88, at 23-24; see CONST. OF ZAMBIA Aug.
24, 1991, art. 43(3) (providing that a former president cannot be charged with a
criminal offense for acts done while in office, unless the National Assembly
determines that the proceeding will “not be contrary to the interests of the
State”).
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human rights norms.211 On the other hand, financial
incentives in the form of generous retirement packages will
not only ensure that former presidents have a reasonably
comfortable and dignified standard of living in retirement
but also that they will have no reason to embezzle
government funds whilst in office in order to prepare for
their future retirement. The fact that extremists like Robert
Mugabe of Zimbabwe have not been induced to leave office
gracefully in the face of promises of generous retirement
packages and immunity does not diminish the importance of
enticing presidents to leave office in this manner.213 Besides
such constitutional measures, there are other means
currently being used to coax African leaders to leave power
at the end of their term. The best example is the Mo
Ibrahim awards given to retired leaders who displayed
exceptional leadership qualities.214 The possibility of offering
211. Indeed, the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia confers qualified
immunity on the president after leaving office. Article 31(3) provides that after a
President has vacated office:
(b) a civil or criminal Court shall only have jurisdiction to entertain
proceedings against him or her, in respect of acts of commission or
omission alleged to have been perpetrated in his or her personal
capacity whilst holding President, if Parliament by resolution has
removed the President on the grounds specified in this Constitution
and if a resolution is adopted by Parliament resolving that any such
proceedings are justified in the public interest notwithstanding any
damage such proceedings might cause to the dignity of the office of
President.
CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF NAMIB. Feb. 9, 1990, art. 31(3).
213. Owen Gagare, UN Offered Mugabe „Exit Package,‟ NEWSDAY (Dec. 19,
2010, 19:27), http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2010-12-19-un-offered-mugabeexit-package; see also Fombad & Inegbedion, supra note 88, at 27. The
additional advantage of entrenching these incentives in the constitution is that
it will prevent an incumbent from making such pension and other immunities a
condition precedent to them retiring.
214. The Sudanese-born billionaire, Mr. Mo Ibrahim, has established the Mo
Ibrahim Foundation, which awards the Ibrahim Prize each year to any retired
president or prime minister who has served his country well. The Ibrahim Prize,
MO IBRAHIM FOUNDATION, http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/theibrahim-prize (last visited Aug. 2, 2011). Unprecedented in its scale and scope,
the Ibrahim Prize “consists of $5 million over ten years and $200,000 annually
for life thereafter.” Id. A further $200,000 per year for good causes espoused by
the winner may be granted by the Foundation during the first ten years. Id. An
Ibrahim Index of Good Governance is used to “collate data on the economic and
social progress of every nation” on the African continent. Mamphela Ramphele,
Africa: Continent Will Reap Reward of Leadership, ALLAFRICA.COM (Apr. 5,
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them prestigious positions in regional or international
organizations has also been discussed.215
Finally, another problem that needs to be urgently
addressed is the tendency for many African presidents to
abuse the absolute immunity which they enjoy from both
criminal and civil proceedings, although in many
Anglophone countries, such immunity does not apply to civil
wrongs committed in the discharge of official duties, which
are usually imputable to the state.216 The objective of
presidential immunity is certainly not to place the president
above the law and give him a license to violate other
people‟s rights with impunity. Presidents are usually
charged with a long list of supervisory and policy
responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity that any
unnecessary diversion of their energies by concerns with
private lawsuits would pose serious risks to the effective
functioning of government.217 It is quite possible that in the
often volatile political climate that operates today, an
unrestricted right to sue the president may generate a large
2007), http://allafrica.com/stories/200704050143.html. Members of the prize
committee include Kofi Annan, the former Secretary General of the UN, Salim
Ahmed Salim, former Secretary General of the OAU and former prime minister
of Tanzania, and Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, former Finance Minister and Foreign
Minister of Nigeria. The Ibrahim Prize Committee, MO IBRAHIM FOUNDATION,
http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/section/the-ibrahim-prize/the-ibrahimprize-committee (last visited Aug. 2, 2011). It is, however, important to note that
this move is not without its critics, who feel that the prize is misplaced because
it enriches people who have already accumulated more than enough wealth in
office. See Kwodwo Asante, MO Ibrahim Award is Useless, PEACE FM ONLINE
(Oct. 20, 2009), http://elections.peacefmonline.com/politics/200910/29540.php.
215. This suggestion was made by the prominent African scholar, Professor Ali
Mazrui. Roger Southall, Presidential Transitions and Political Accountability,
THE NORDIC AFRICA INSTITUTE (Jan. 2006), http://www.nai.uu.se/publications/
news/archives/061southall/index.xml. Southall points out that “the idea has
been taken up by the African Union, which is increasingly appointing former
presidents to serve as mediators in conflicts between or within member
countries.” Id. This will certainly depend on the record and reputation of the
particular former leader in question. It is difficult to see how some leaders, such
as Robert Mugabe, Paul Biya, and Hosni Mubarak could, on their retirement
and with any credibility, be used as mediators or guardians of democracy on the
continent.
216. See HATCHARD ET AL., supra note 3, at 81-90.
217. For a discussion of the reasoning of this concept in the United States, see
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 751 (1982).
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volume of politically motivated harassing and frivolous
litigation that will not only impact negatively on the dignity
of this office but may also distract the president from his
high and exacting duties. Nevertheless, because of the poor
record of most African leaders in living up to the terms of
their oath of office to faithfully and diligently discharge
their duties as chief law enforcer, in maintaining the
constitution, and in upholding the laws of the land, it is
submitted that there is no longer any justification for
absolute presidential immunity. As a general rule, the
constitution should certainly allow for presidential
immunity with respect to both civil and criminal
proceedings; however, in order to ensure that this immunity
does not become a license for abuse of powers, the following
should be exceptions:
(i)
Civil proceedings for acts or omissions
committed by the president in his official
capacity, because responsibility for this is
usually imputed to the state.
(ii)
Crimes or wrongs committed before the
president assumed office. To reduce the risk of
corrupt leadership, the presidential office should
be reserved for those who have a clean record
and not those who want to use the office to
escape liability for their past misdeeds.
(iii) Any private act that amounts to abuse of the
official position for private ends as well as any
act that violates the spirit of the constitution.218
Two points must be noted. First, it is not enough that
there are often provisions providing for the impeachment of
the president. Enforcing these provisions usually involves a
cumbrous political process that the dominant parties of
today will easily frustrate. Second, provisions limiting the
scope of presidential immunity go hand in hand with
provisions on term limits. The latter is designed to prevent
presidents for life, and ensure that the right to legal action
against former presidents can be exercised at a time when
the evidence is still relatively fresh or has not been lost or
218. If these standards were followed, the Botswana Court of Appeal would
not have allowed the President of Botswana to use presidential immunity as a
means to get rid of his political rivals in Motswaledi v. Botswana Democratic
Party 2009 BWCA 111 (CA) (Bots.). See supra note 96.
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destroyed and witnesses have not died. Presidents who stay
in power for inordinately long periods, or indefinitely, may
never be held to account for their wrongful actions. Limiting
the scope of presidential powers must go hand in hand with
more concrete steps in dealing with the problems of the poor
and marginalized in society.
D. Addressing Poverty Through the Recognition of
Socio-economic Rights
Constitutional reforms, however extensive in their scope
and however well intentioned, are unlikely to provide a
solid foundation for constitutionalism if they fail to address
the concerns of the weak and vulnerable in society. It wasn‟t
merely the lack of political participation that forced people
to come out on the streets in the early 1990s; the rising
unemployment, poverty, hunger, and the widening gap
between the ruling elites and the masses caused by decades
of dictatorship and mismanagement of the economy had
been a critical factor.219 Yet, the new constitutional
dispensation in many countries did not specifically address
the issue of equitable distribution of the nation‟s resources,
nor was there any attempt to liberate the masses from the
scourges of poverty, oppression, and discrimination. As a
consequence, the right to vote for a party of ones‟ choice, the
most visible sign of Africa‟s democratic credentials, will
remain meaningless for as long as a majority of the
population lack the opportunities to lift themselves out of
the poverty trap, lack personal security, and are unable to
have access to healthcare and basic education.
Many modern African constitutions either contain no
provisions on matters relating to socio-economic rights—
what are generally referred to as second generation
rights220—or refer to them in obscure and programmatic
219. I.S. Ogundiya, Domestic Rebellion in Africa, INT‟L. J. PEACE & DEV. STUD.,
Nov. 2010, at 25, 30.
220. The idea of dividing human rights into three generations was developed
by jurist Karel Vasak. See Karel Vasak, Human Rights: A Thirty-Year Struggle:
The Sustained Efforts to Give Force of Law to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, UNESCO COURIER, Nov. 1977, at 29. Although controversial, it
has since been adopted as a reasonable approach to analyzing and
understanding the different types of human rights. Second generation human
rights are based on principles of social justice and public obligation and tend to
be positive in nature. They are fundamentally social, economic, and cultural in

2011]

AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM

1059

language. For example, from the constitutions of fifty-three
countries analyzed in the Heyns and Kaguongo study, the
right to an adequate standard of living appears only in
fourteen, the right to housing and shelter in twelve, the
right to food and nutrition in eight, the right to clean and
safe water in six, the right to education in forty-five, the
right to social security in twenty-nine, and the right to
development in twenty-four constitutions.221
A World Bank Report released on March 22, 2010 states
that the number of people in Sub-Saharan Africa who live
on less than two dollars a day has doubled from 292 million
in 1981 to 555 million in 2005.222 Poverty and the needs
unfulfilled by the new constitutional dispensation probably
pose one of the greatest threats to constitutionalism. In
South Africa, service delivery protests have become a daily
occurrence, and the threat by some of the poor communities
to intensify their protests during the 2010 World Cup
alarmed the government.223
Whilst no constitutional design or principle can on its
own eradicate poverty and unemployment, it is submitted
that it can nevertheless do two things that may
considerably improve the conditions of the poor. First, it can
reduce the endemic quiet corruption that is a major cause of
failure to deliver goods and services paid for by the
government through the constitutional entrenchment of
nature and are designed to ensure equal and fair conditions of treatment for all
citizens. Id.
221. Heyns & Kaguongo, supra note 36, at 715-16.
222. See Mohammed A. Salih, Corruption Carries High Cost, World Bank Says,
INTER PRESS SERVICE (Mar. 16, 2010), http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?
idnews=50679.
223. See Frank Nxumalo, Service Delivery Protests Curious—HSRC, SABC
NEWS (Mar. 16, 2010, 1:53), http://www.sabcnews.com/portal/site/SABCNews/
menuitem.5c4f8fe7ee929f602ea12ea1674daeb9/?vgnextoid=9b8ca56b0c667210V
gnVCM10000077d4ea9bRCRD&vgnextfmt=default; World Cup Could be
Disrupted by Violent Housing Protests, TELEGRAPH (UK), Mar. 10, 2010,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/world-cup-2010/7413494/World-Cupcould-be-disrupted-by-violent-housing-protests.html. Yet the South African
President was spending 65 million rand (actually over $9.6 million in U.S.
dollars at today‟s exchange rate) in expanding his rural home. The new
homestead is expected to have a police station, a helicopter pad, and a military
clinic. All this, according to a press statement, was at his own cost. Sakhile
Modise, South Africa President Zuma‟s US$8m Plus Home Renovations, AFRIK NEWS (Dec. 4, 2009), http://www.afrik-news.com/article16589.html.
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accountability principles and institutions discussed earlier.
Second, it can ensure that government resources are used
judiciously and equitably for the common benefit of all. An
essential condition for maintaining respect of the
constitutional order, which entails respect for the rule of
law and social order, therefore requires the entrenchment of
socio-economic rights in terms which allow for a more
equitable redistribution of economic, social, and cultural
resources.224 Contrary to the widely held fear that the
entrenchment of socio-economic rights will impose an
unreasonable burden on the state, the South African
Constitution and the jurisprudence of the South African
Constitutional Court has shown how this can be done.225
Thus, in granting everyone a right to housing in section 26
and health care, food, water, and social security in section
27, the constitution makes it clear that the state is only
required to “take reasonable legislative and other measures,
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive
reali[z]ation of these rights.”226 However, such constitutional
provisions on their own will not necessarily improve the
conditions of the poor and marginalized unless the judiciary
adopts a more progressive and imaginative approach to
constitutional interpretation. This brings into focus the
important role that the judiciary has to play in the new
constitutional dispensation.

224. With hundreds of thousands uncertain of one good meal each day it is
difficult to see any justifications for budgeting 200 million rand (about $29.6
million in U.S. dollars at today‟s exchange rate) to upgrade the President‟s
residence in South Africa‟s 2011/2012 budget. See Outrage over R200M Upgrade
of Presidential Residency, INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATS (Feb 25, 2011),
http://www.id.org.za/newsroom/press-releases/id-outrage-over-r200m-upgradeof-presidential-residency.
225. See Danie Brand, Introduction to Socio-Economic Rights in the South
African Constitution, in SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 1, 45 (Danie
Brand & Christof Heyns, eds., 2005) (noting that the court evaluates claims for
socio-economic rights based on a “reasonableness standard” derived from “the
state‟s duty to take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of socio-economic
rights”); Linda Stewart, Adjudicating Socio-Economic Rights Under a
Transformative Constitution, 28 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 487, 492-97 (2010)
(discussing cases where the South African Constitutional Court has “positively
adjudicated” socio-economic rights).
226. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 2, §§ 26, 27(2).
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E. An Independent Judiciary as Promoters and Defenders
of Constitutionalism
Judicial independence is “one of the core element of
modern constitutionalism” and a crucial rock on which
democracy and good governance need to be anchored. 227
Immediately after independence, African leaders quickly
took control of the judiciaries, which, as a consequence,
were hardly ever able to act as guardians of the
constitutions and impartial enforcers of the law.228 Most
post-1990 African constitutions now contain provisions
which purport to provide for and guarantee the
independence of the judiciary.229 However, although judicial
independence is a key feature of liberal democracies,230
attaining the goal of judicial independence remains a
challenge not only to Africa‟s fragile transitional
democracies but even to advanced democracies in Europe,
Japan, and the United States.231 This is because several
studies have shown that judicial independence has never
been a condition that is established fully once and for all or
is enjoyed without debate, controversy or challenge.232 The
importance of judicial independence to strengthening
227. Fombad, A Preliminary Assessment, supra note 43, at 234.
228. Id.
229. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
230. For a discussion of liberal democracy, see SARTORI, supra note 21, at 38393 (“The formula of liberal democracy is equality through liberty, by means of
liberty, not liberty by means of equality.”).
231. See Martin Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND
THE WORLD 273 (Peter H. Russell & David M. O‟Brien eds., 2001) (discussing the
judicial independence of the European Court of Justice); David M. O‟Brien &
Yasuo Ohkoshi, Stifling Judicial Independence from Within: The Japanese
Judiciary, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD, supra, at 37, 39 (“[W]e present new
data showing that expressions of individual judicial independence have in fact
declined [in Japan] during the 1980s and 1990s.”); Henry J. Abraham, The
Pillars and Politics of Judicial Independence in the United States, in JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND
THE WORLD, supra, at 25, 26-28 (discussing the removal by impeachment of
United States district court judges).
232. See, e.g., Peter H. Russell, Judicial Independence in Comparative
Perspective, in J UDICIAL I NDEPENDENCE IN THE A GE OF DEMOCRACY : C RITICAL
PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE W ORLD, supra note 231, at 301.
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democracy is underlined by the observation made by an
American judge that “the U.S. Constitution would be just a
piece of paper today if there were not independent judges to
enforce it.”233
Because of the important role that judges in a
constitutional system firmly rooted on constitutionalism
have to play, it is inevitable that the prospects for
deepening constitutionalism on the continent would require
more serious measures to enhance the judicial role. Three
main issues are critical: the strengthening of judicial
independence and judicial competence, the expansion of the
scope for judicial intervention, and the judiciary itself acting
as agents of constitutional change and development.
1. Enhancing Judicial Independence. The only elaborate
study on post-1990 judicial institutions in Africa carried out
so far was performed by the Democratic Governance Rights
Unit at the University of Cape Town and published in early
2006 (“UCT study”).234 It is however, limited to eleven
English speaking countries in Southern and Eastern
Africa.235 The UCT study nevertheless provides a useful
indication of the reality emerging from the attempts to
constitutionalize judicial independence in Africa. It
concludes that the “degree to which each of the 11 judicial
systems approximates to a substantially independent
mechanism . . . varies, although the general picture
sketched is not a happy one.”236 In the light of this study and
a broader analysis of the constitutional provisions dealing
with
judicial
independence
in
these
post-1990
constitutions,237 it is clear that the important role an
independent judiciary plays in the body politic is now,
unlike in the recent past, recognized and accepted.238
233. Richard Arnold, Should More Limits be Placed on the Federal Judiciary:
No, SPECTRUM: J. ST. GOV‟T, Summer 1997, at 29, 29.
234. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND RIGHTS UNIT, THE JUDICIAL INSTITUTION IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS (Linda
Van de Vijver ed., 2006).
235. See id. The countries covered in the study are Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho,
Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe.
236. Id. at 279.
237. Fombad, A Preliminary Assessment, supra note 43, at 233-57.
238. Id.
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Nevertheless, there remain numerous challenges, especially
the lack of good will, even in countries like South Africa, to
allow the judiciary to operate independently and effectively
without political interference. Bearing this in mind, it is
submitted that any future reform agenda must pay
particular attention to two issues.
First, there is need to entrench what are now
considered to be the core principles of judicial independence
in the constitution, rather than in ordinary legislation. This
must be so, notwithstanding the well documented fact that
Britain, New Zealand, and Israel are operating efficiently
with functioning independent judiciaries without any
entrenched constitutional provisions.239 Constitutionalizing
judicial independence in this way does not guarantee that
there will be no unwarranted interference by the executive
with the judiciary, but it will certainly increase the odds
against such interference.
Second, it is necessary that the bodies—such as Judicial
Service Commissions or Higher Council of Magistracy—that
decide important issues such as appointments, promotions,
and dismissal of judges are made less vulnerable to partisan
manipulation. They should be constituted in such a manner
that the chairperson and the majority of members are
independent of the government in power. Even then, the
effectiveness of the judiciary will depend on the scope their
powers to review constitutional violations, which also needs
to be expanded.
2. The Expansion in the Scope for Judicial Review.
Africa received and adopted two main systems of judicial
review: the American and the French model.240 Although
239. See Brice Dickson, Judicial Activism in the House of Lords 1995-2007, in
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN COMMON LAW SUPREME COURTS 363 (Brice Dickson ed.,
2007) (describing activist opinions of Britain‟s House of Lords); Bruce Harris,
Judicial Activism and New Zealand‟s Appellate Courts, in JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN
COMMON LAW SUPREME COURTS, supra, at 273 (discussing “the scope New
Zealand law leaves for judicial creativity and the extent to which it has taken
place”); Eli Salzberger, Judicial Activism in Israel, in JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN
COMMON LAW SUPREME COURTS, supra, at 217 (analyzing judicial activism and
its sources in Israel).
240. See discussion in Charles Manga Fombad, Paper presented at the Konrad
Adenauer Foundation and Max Planck Institute Conference: Constitutional
Courts, Human Rights, Democracy and Development: African Constitutional
Courts (Nov. 12-13, 2009).
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substantial improvements have been made to the inherited
French model in the modern constitutions of many
Francophone and Lusophone African countries,241 the
French model remains a very restricted and fairly
ineffective means of ensuring that governments do not
violate the constitution.242 Though there is no perfect
system, there are good examples, such as the South African
Constitutional Court and the Constitutional Court of
Benin.243 There are others systems which are ineffective and
merely shams designed to obfuscate the desire to avoid
constitutional
adjudication,
such
as
Cameroon‟s
Constitutional Council.244 A recent study suggests that a
mixed model such as that adopted under the South African
Constitution provides many advantages from which many
African countries can learn.245
Be that as it may, it is submitted that there are certain
features which any modern African system of constitutional
adjudication should have in order to be effective. First,
adjudication of disputes should be by a judicial body
operating within the hierarchy of courts whether as a
specialized or non-specialized court. This is preferable to a
quasi-judicial/quasi-administrative body, such as the
constitutional court model, which operates outside the
hierarchy of courts. Second, constitutional adjudication
should be flexible by being both diffuse and concentrated,
and should provide for both an abstract and a concrete
review of constitutionality of laws. Third, litigants should be
241. Charles M. Fombad, African Constitutional Courts: Trends and
Challenges (forthcoming).
242. Id.
243. For an interesting account of the great strides made by the Benin
Constitutional Court to improve and avoid the limitations of the Constitutional
Council model, which it inherited at independence, see Anna Rotman, Benin‟s
Constitutional Court: An Institutional Model for Guaranteeing Human Rights,
17 HARV. H UM . RTS . J. 281, 285-95 (2004).
244. See Fombad, Cameroonian Council, supra note 41, at 136-37 (“Only the
president and a few specified political elites can challenge the constitutionality
of any law, and this before Constitutional Council . . . a body composed
essentially of his nominees.”).
245. Fombad, supra note 240, at 38 (“[T]his mixed model . . . provides for both
abstract and concrete [judicial] review [that] reflects a remarkable exercise in
creative imagination, pragmatism and opportunism that has been shaped by the
country‟s history.”); see infra Part III.E.3.b.
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provided with a remedy not only when the authorities
violate or threaten to violate the constitution, but also
where the alleged violation consists of a failure to fulfill a
constitutional obligation. This may result in a declaration of
unconstitutionality for the omission to carry out a
constitutional obligation246 and is necessary on a continent
where the executive and legislatures are well noted for
regularly ignoring the implementation of constitutional
provisions.247 This unique remedy will probably cajole or
force the other two branches of government (that is, the
legislature and the executive) to fulfill their constitutional
obligations. It will guarantee that compliance with
constitutional obligations is not a matter that lies within
the exclusive and absolute discretion of these two branches.
This form of judicial control of constitutionality is highly
developed in certain countries, especially in Latin
America.248
Finally, it is also worth noting that the scope of judicial
review may also depend on the temperament and attitude of
the judges. For example, two specialized courts, the French
Constitutional Council and the German Constitutional
Court, confounded their designers by becoming more
effective defenders of the constitution largely due to the
open-minded and proactive nature of the judges who have
sat in these courts.249 This discussion leads to the next issue:
the judicial role in promoting constitutionalism.

246. Arguably, the South African Constitution provides for this possibility
under chapter 1, section 2, which states that the “obligations imposed by [the
constitution] must be fulfilled.” S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 1, § 2 (emphasis added).
247. For example, for more than twelve years after the amended Cameroon
Constitution of 1996 appeared to provide for radical changes such as the
establishment of a second chamber of parliament, the establishment of a
Constitutional Council, the replacement of the existing provinces with regions,
nothing was done.
248. See Gilmar Mendes, Constitutional Jurisdiction in Brazil: The Problem of
Unconstitutional Legislative Omission 2 (May 27, 2008) (unpublished
manuscript),
available at
http://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/noticiaArtigo
Discurso/anexo/lituaniaIngles.pdf (noting that the constitutional actions
available in Brazil are “complemented by a variety of instruments aimed at
exercising abstract control of constitutionality by the Brazilian Federal Supreme
Court”).
249. See, e.g., Fombad, Cameroonian Council, supra note 41, at 185 (“[T]he
French Constitutional Council has created for itself the power and duty to
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3. The Judiciary as Active Agents of Change. An
independent judiciary with wide powers to undertake
judicial review on its own is not sufficient. As Chidi
Odinkalu has observed, “[t]he first generation of
Constitutions and Bills of Rights in Common Law Africa
was destroyed not so much by the intolerance of the
executive as by the enthusiastic abdication of judicial
responsibilities by the [judges].”250 Constitutionalism can
only develop and grow with judges who are liberal,
progressive, activist, or who have “bold spirits” and not the
“timorous souls”251 of the passive judges of the recent past. If
constitutionalism is to survive in Africa, then judges must
be ready to play a more proactive role than they have
played so far. It is contended that the constitutional rights
revolution can only be realized with a judiciary that is ready
to use its powers to negate the continuous authoritarian
impulses of elected politicians. This requires a new judicial
attitude towards adjudication in which judges adopt a more
principled and rights-sensitive approach that takes account
of the radical political, economic, and social changes of our
times and the revulsion against dictatorship. In many
instances it seems that the revised or new constitutions
were not only designed to eliminate dictatorship and
promote democracy and good governance but also to
promote a new human rights culture that is particularly
sensitive to issues such as hunger, poverty, unemployment,
ignorance, illiteracy, disease, and other social ills that have
inflicted so much hardship on a majority of the population
on the continent. Attaining these goals requires a judiciary
that is willing to reflect the new spirit of constitutionalism
when interpreting these constitutions.
As the judiciary stands firmly between the individual
citizens and the wielders of power, they are the ultimate
arbiter in the arena of constitutional rights and need to take
an activist role in adjudication. To place much reliance on
control the conformity of non-promulgated legislation beyond what is stated in
the constitution.”).
250. Chidi Anselm Odinkalu, The Judiciary and the Legal Protection of Human
Rights in Common Law Africa: Allocating Responsibility for the Failure of PostIndependence Bills of Rights, 8 AFR. SOC‟Y INT‟L & COMP. L. PROC. 124, 136-37
(1996).
251. Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., (1951) 2 K.B. 164, 178 (C.A.) (UK)
(Denning, L.J., dissenting).
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judges to defend and in many respects attempt through the
judicial process to fill some of the gaps left by the 1990
reforms is bound to be controversial. However, the African
judiciary cannot be immune from the forces of globalization
which has affected all areas of political, social, and economic
life. The conservative inward-looking culture which was
characteristic of the old judiciary has to be abandoned as
judges must now see themselves as members of a global
legal community where knowledge and ideas are exchanged
across jurisdictions. The need for adopting broad
interpretative techniques in interpreting constitutions also
inheres from the very nature of a constitution itself. Far
from being a document that contains “time-worn adages or
hollow shibboleths,”252 or a “lifeless museum piece,”253 a
constitution must be regarded as a living document which is
designed to serve present and future generations as well as
embody and reflect the fears, hopes, aspirations, and desires
of the people.254 Judges, it is argued, have a duty to
continuously breathe life into the constitution.
The concept of judicial activism, although controversial,
has an important role to play in entrenching the rule of law
and constitutional governance in Africa. It must, from the
outset, be made clear that the concept does not lend itself to
an exact definition.255 It has variously been defined as: (i) a
philosophy advocating that judges should interpret the
constitution to reflect contemporary conditions and
values;256 (ii) when courts do not confine themselves to
reasonable interpretations of law, but instead create law;257
or (iii) when courts do not limit their ruling to the dispute
252. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (Warren, C.J.).
253. Attorney-General v. Dow 1992 B.L.R. 119 (CA) at 166 (Aguda, J.A.) (Bots.).
254. Some argue that the constitution is for the living, and the present
generation should no longer be ruled by the “dead hand” of their ancestors. See
Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO.
W ASH. L. REV. 1127, 1127-28 (1998).
255. See, e.g., C HRISTOPHER W OLFE , J UDICIAL ACTIVISM : BULWARK OF
FREEDOM OR PRECARIOUS S ECURITY ? 1-32 (rev. ed. 1997) (providing a range of
both conventional and radical definitions of judicial activism).
256. See BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 850 (7th ed. 1999) (“A philosophy of judicial
decision-making whereby judges allow their personal views about public policy,
among other factors, to guide their decisions . . . .”).
257. See id. (“[A]dherents of this philosophy . . . are willing to ignore
precedent.”).
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before them, but instead establish a new rule to apply
broadly to issues not presented in the specific action.258 At
the core of the concept is the notion that in deciding a case
judges—particularly those of the appellate court—may, or
some advocate must, reform the law if the existing rules or
principles appear defective. On such a view, it could be
argued that judges should not hesitate to go beyond their
traditional role as interpreters of the constitution and laws
given to them by others in order to assume a role as
independent policy makers or independent “trustees” on
behalf of society.259 The array of existing “disparate, even
contradictory,” ways of defining the concept has made its
meaning increasingly unclear.260 For the purposes of this
discussion, the concept refers to the situation in which
judges go beyond their traditional role as interpreters of the
constitution and strive to give effect to contemporary social
conditions and values.
This concept is traditionally the opposite of the concept
of judicial restraint, whereby the courts interpret the
constitution and any law to avoid second-guessing the policy
decisions made by other governmental institutions such as
parliament and the president, within their constitutional
spheres of authority.261 On such a view, judges have no
popular mandate to act as policy makers and should defer to
the decisions of the elected “political” branches of the
258. See Kenneth M. Holland, Introduction to J UDICIAL ACTIVISM IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1, 1 (Kenneth M. Holland ed., 1991) (“Judicial
activism comes into existence when courts to not confine themselves to
adjudication of legal conflicts but adventure to make social policies, affecting
thereby many more people and interests than if they confined themselves to the
resolution of narrow disputes.”).
259. See Lino A. Graglia, It‟s Not Constitutionalism, It‟s Judicial Activism, 19
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL ‟Y 293, 296 (1996) (defining judicial activism as “the
practice by judges of disallowing policy choices by other governmental officials
or institutions that the Constitution does not clearly prohibit”); see also Greg
Jones, Proper Judicial Activism, 14 REGENT U. L. REV. 141, 143 (2002)
(defining the term as “any occasion where a court intervenes and strikes down a
piece of duly enacted legislation”).
260. Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meaning of „Judicial Activism,‟
92 CALIF . L. REV. 1441, 1442-43 (2004) (“[A]s the term has become more
commonplace, its meaning has become increasingly unclear.”).
261. See id. at 1146-50 (comparing activists justices with restrained justices
who believe that “laws have fixed meanings,” and that these meanings should
not be changed “no matter which groups may benefit from the departure”).
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government in matters of policy making so long as these
policymakers stay within the limits of their powers as
defined by the constitution.262 This Article will not debate
the pros and cons of these two concepts263 but will start from
the premise that judicial activism is a reality in any modern
judicial system that aspires to promote and defend
constitutionalism.
The tremendous contribution that judicial activism has
made to the development of modern constitutional law in
two jurisdictions, one in Africa and the other abroad, will be
used to show its prospects.264 First, there is India, an
underdeveloped country, which continues to grapple with
problems similar to those that African countries face today.
The other is South Africa, where the judges, especially those
of the Constitutional Court, have through bold and
imaginative interpretative approaches strengthened the
credibility of the new constitutional order. It will be shown
that through judicial activism the frontiers of fundamental
human rights and social justice have been expanded in both
countries. On account of the importance of this judicial role
in (1) defending constitutions; (2) developing, in an indirect
and incremental manner, new principles of constitutional
law; and (3) filling in some of the gaps left by the 1990
reforms, this issue will be discussed in some depth. This
Article will first address the Indian experience.
a. The Experiences of Constitutional Development
Through Judicial Activism in India. The judiciary in India
has through a process of judicial activism struggled to bring
law into the service of the poor and oppressed. Under what
is usually known as public interest or social action
litigation, and in the enforcement of fundamental rights
under the constitution, the Indian courts “have sought to
rebalance the distribution of legal resources [and] increase
access to justice for the disadvantaged.”265 Judicial activism
262. See Graglia, supra note 259, at 296.
263. See generally THOMAS SOWELL, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM RECONSIDERED (1989)
(debating the merits of judicial activism and judicial restraint).
264. For a detailed discussion, see Emmanuel Quansah & Charles Manga
Fombad, Judicial Activism as a Defence to Authoritarian Impulses: Lessons from
India, Botswana and South Africa (forthcoming).
265. Jamie Cassels, Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India:
Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 495, 497-98 (1989).
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in India, especially its approach in public interest litigation,
has been widely commented upon.266 It will suffice to note
that through the process of judicial activism, the Indian
judiciary can be considered to have rebalanced the scale of
constitutional justice in the country in at least four areas:
rules of standing have been liberalized, rules which provide
procedural flexibility in litigation have been introduced,
legal and fundamental rights have been interpreted
creatively, and remedial flexibility has been introduced.267
One of the areas in which judicial activism has been
greatly felt is in the increase of individual access to the legal
process, which had become chaotic, expensive, time
consuming, and too technical.268 In order to exclude
intermeddlers and prevent a flood of litigation, the Indian
courts had stuck to the traditional locus standi rule which
requires the parties to have some real interest in the
proceedings.269 However, in its attempts to help the poor and
needy to vindicate the violation of their fundamental
rights,270 the Supreme Court sidetracked the sanctity of
locus standi and the procedural complexities that were an
impediment to access to the courts.271 Thus, as early as
1976, the Court had declared that “[w]here a wrong against
266. See, e.g., S.P. SATHE , J UDICIAL ACTIVISM IN I NDIA : TRANSGRESSING
BORDERS AND ENFORCING LIMITS 18-24 (2002); P.N. Bhagwati, Judicial
Activism and Public Interest Litigation, 23 COLUM . J. TRANSNAT ‟L L. 561 (1985);
Cassels, supra note 265; N.R. Madhava Menon, Public Interest Litigation: A
Major Breakthrough in the Delivery of Social Justice, 9 J. B. COUNCIL I NDIA 150
(1982).
267. For further discussion on this topic, see Cassels, supra note 265, at 498.
268. The magnitude of problems faced by litigants can best be gleaned from
Bibek Debroy‟s report. See Bibek Debroy, Losing a World Record, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Feb. 14, 2002, at 23 (reporting that in 2002 there were more than 23
million pending cases in Indian courts).
269. Cassels, supra note 265, at 498.
270. See Vijayashri Sripati, Constitutionalism in India and South Africa: A
Comparative Study from a Human Rights Perspective, 16 TUL . J. I NT ‟L & COMP .
L. 49, 98-104 (2007) (describing how the Supreme Court of India “sought to
address broader social issues and . . . began to protect socioeconomic rights”); see
also H. Kwasi Prempeh, Marbury in Africa: Judicial Review and the Challenge
of Constitutionalism in Contemporary Africa, 80 TUL . L. REV. 1239, 1300-01
(2006) (noting that the Supreme Court initiated procedural and substantive
innovations in order to recognize the demands of social justice).
271. Prempeh, supra note 270, at 1301.
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community interest is done, „no locus standi‟ will not always
be a plea to non-suit an interested public body chasing the
wrongdoer in court.”272 Since then, the public interest
litigation has been initiated by individuals on behalf of
other individuals and groups, by academics, journalists, and
many civil society organizations.273 The court has also
allowed public interest litigation to vindicate the right to
fair judicial procedure,274 the right to legal aid,275 the right to
livelihood,276 and the right to live free of pollution.277
Another area of judicial innovation by the Indian
judiciary has been in the introduction of procedural
flexibilities in litigation. Actions do not need to be
commenced by a formal petition; a letter addressed to the
judge or the court will suffice.278 A judge has even
commenced an action by converting a letter to the editor in
a newspaper into a public interest writ.279 Further
procedural flexibilities are provided by courts waiving fees,
awarding costs, and providing other forms of litigation
assistance to public interest advocates.280 The courts found

272. Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1977) 1 S.C.R. 1072, 1083 (1976) (India).
273. In Gupta v. Union of India, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 365 (1981) (India), Chief
Justice Ghagwati explained this approach: “[W]here a legal wrong or a legal
injury is caused to a person or to a determinate class of persons . . . and such a
person or determinate class of persons is by reason of poverty, helplessness or
disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position, unable to approach
the court for relief, any member of [the] public can maintain an application for
an appropriate direction . . . .” Id. at 520.
274. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, (1978) 3 S.C.C. 544, 552-53 (India).
275. Id. at 554-55.
276. Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp. (1985) 2 S.C.R. Supp. 51, 52 (India).
277. Rural Litig. & Entitlement Kendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1988) 2
S.C.R. Supp. 690, 726-27 (India) (ordering mines to close in order to promote the
preservation of forests).
278. Jasper Vikas George, Public Interest Litigation, NGOS INDIA (Aug. 3,
2005), http://www.ngosindia.com/resources/pil_sc.php.
279. See Menon, supra note 266, at 158-60.
280. For example, in Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 579 (India),
the petitioner, a professor of political science who had done extensive research
in the State‟s administration, was “deeply interested in ensuring proper
implementation of constitutional provisions.” Id. at 579. He challenged the
State‟s practice of repromulgating a number of ordinances without proper
approval from the legislature. Id. at 579-80. The Supreme Court directed the
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that the adversarial process could operate fairly and
produce just results only where the two parties are evenly
matched in strength and resources, but, given that the poor
often lacked the social and material resources, they were
bound to be at a disadvantage in producing all relevant
evidence before the court.281 The court decided to abandon
the laissez-faire approach in the judicial process and
devised a strategy and procedure for ascertaining,
establishing, and articulating the claims and demands of
the poor by appointing socio-legal commissions of inquiry.282
It is in dealing with the fundamental rights provisions
in the Indian Constitution that the Indian judiciary has
been very bold. The former Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, P.N. Bhagwati, an exponent par excellence of judicial
activism, has argued that in interpreting the constitution,
the Supreme Court is neither bound by doctrines of literal
meaning or original intent, nor constrained to read into it
only formal rights and liberties. He put it thus:
The judges in India have asked themselves the question: can
judges really escape addressing themselves to substantial
questions of social justice? Can they . . . simply follow the legal
text when they are aware that their actions will perpetuate
inequality and injustice? Can they restrict their inquiry into law
and life within the narrow confines of a narrowly defined rule of
283
law?

Through
an expansive interpretation of the
fundamental rights provisions, the Supreme Court in Tellis
State of Bihar to pay the petitioner 10,000 rupees for his excellent research that
brought to light this repressive action. Id. at 590.
281. See Sripati, supra note 270, at 103-04.
282. The practice of appointing socio-legal commissions of inquiry for the
purpose of gathering relevant material and information bearing on the case put
forward on behalf of a disadvantaged individual or section of a community in
social action litigation has now been institutionalized as a result of the Indian
Supreme Court ruling in Morcha v. Union of India (Bonded Labour Case), A.I.R.
1984 S.C. 802 (1983). See generally P.N. Bhagwati, Social Action Litigation: The
Indian Experience, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES 20
(Neelan Tiruchelvan & Radhika Coomaraswamy eds., 1987) (discussing the
judicial creation of new ways to bring issues affecting unrepresented people
before the courts).
283. P.N. Bhagwati, Bureaucrats? Phonographers? Creators?, THE TIMES
I NDIA , Sept. 1986, at 21-23.
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v. Bombay Municipal Corp. stated that “the sweep of the
right to life conferred in article 21 [of the Constitution] is
wide and far reaching” and includes the right to a
livelihood.284 In Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, the court
stated that “the right to life includes the right to live with
human dignity and all that goes along with it . . . must in
any view of the matter include the right to the basic
necessities of life.”285 In Morcha v. Union of India, it was
noted that article 21 of the Indian Constitution had been
interpreted to include the right to be “free from
exploitation.”286
Finally, the Indian courts have devised judicial
remedies that go beyond the traditional judicial remedies
mainly through the flexible interpretation of their inherent
powers to do justice. In providing remedies that require
continuous supervision by the courts, they appear to shift
the line that separates adjudication from administration.
The courts have not only appointed socio-legal commissions
to gather facts, but have gone further to create agencies to
suggest appropriate remedies and to monitor compliance. In
Mehta v. Union of India,287 the lower court permitted a
chemical plant to reopen after a gas leak only after it had
satisfied specified stringent conditions.288 The court then
noted that the company was required to obtain licenses for
its manufacturing activities under several statutes.289 The
company was subject to the control of the state “on all such
activities . . . which can jeopardize public interest.”290
In Morcha v. Union of India,291 in dealing with
oppressed workers, the court instructed local officials to
284. Tellis v. Bombay Mun. Corp., (1986) 2 S.C.R. Supp. 51, 52 (1985) (India).
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution states that “No person shall be deprived of
his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.”
INDIA CONST. Jan. 26, 1950, art. 21.
285. Mullin v. Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516, 529 (India).
286. Morcha v. Union of India (Bonded Labour Case), A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802, 811
(1983).
287. Mehta v. Union of India (Shriram Fertilizer), (1987) 1 S.C.R. 819 (1986)
(India).
288. Id. at 826.
289. Id. at 839.
290. Id.
291. A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802 (1983) (India).
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identify the victims and provide them with physical,
economic, and psychological rehabilitation.292 The officials
were also directed by the court to accept the assistance of
social action groups to set up labor camps to educate
workers about their legal rights and to ensure a pollutionfree environment with adequate sanitary, medical and legal
facilities.293 Indian courts have even gone further to provide
remedies to ensure that their decisions are enforced by
setting up a monitoring agency which would continuously
check and report on the implementation of these
decisions.294 Thus, in the Morcha case the court made an
order giving various directions for identifying, releasing and
rehabilitating bonded laborers.295 The order also contained
instructions for ensuring “adequate and appropriate” wage
payments, observance of labor laws, provision of good
drinking water and setting up dust-sucking machines in the
stone quarries.296 It also set up a monitoring agency to check
continuously and report on the implementation of these
directions.297 In another case, it gave a state government
instruction
to
prepare
annual
reports
detailing
implementation of the Court‟s decisions.298 The courts have
clearly recognized the fact that they cannot force the state
to enact legislation to enhance fundamental rights or to
pursue the directive principles, but the true measure of
their judicial activism, which is of relevance to us here, is
found less in the rhetoric of rights definition than in the
292. Id. at 827-28 (“Physical rehabilitation must go side by side with physical
and economic rehabilitation.”).
293. Id. at 827-28; 830-31.
294. See Cassels, supra note 265, at 505-07 (citing the Shriram Fertilizer and
Bonded Labour Case as examples of this policy approach in environmental
litigation).
295. Morcha v. Union of India (Bonded Labour Case), A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802,
834-36 (1983) (India); see Bhagwati, supra note 282, at 28-31; Bhagwati, supra
note 266, at 574-75 (noting that Morcha “institutionalized” use of appointed
commissions to gather relevant information for public interest litigation); see
also Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court of India, 1 INT‟L J. CONST. L. 476, 50004 (2003) (discussing the Supreme Court of India‟s effort to enforce the rights of
the weak by expanding its own remedial powers).
296. Morcha v. Union of India (Bonded Labour Case), A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802, 835
(1983) (India).
297. Id. at 836-37.
298. See Bhagwati, supra note 282, at 28.
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remedial strategies they have deployed to deal with the
public interest litigation cases.299
The apparent “politicization” of the Indian judiciary has
not been without its critics.300 However, the general
consensus is that judicial activism has served India‟s
democracy and constitutional development well.301 The
Supreme Court‟s willingness to tackle controversial political
and legal issues in a serious and thoughtful manner can be
said to have given it legitimacy.302 It can also be said that
one of the major contributions of judicial activism in India
“has been to provide a safety valve and a hope that justice is
not beyond reach.”303 Furthermore, the courts‟ adoption of a
proactive role to make up for the inefficiencies of the
executive has proved beneficial to Indian society.304 Rao has
expressed the view that “[p]eople, in general now firmly
believe that if any institution or authority acts in a manner
not permitted by the Constitution, the judiciary will step in
to set right the wrong.”305
b. The Experiences of Constitutional Development
Through Judicial Activism in South Africa.306 An excellent
299. See Cassels, supra note 265, at 505-06.
300. See id. at 509-15 (discussing critiques of public interest litigation with a
focus on the “highly problematic” issue of legitimacy); B. Errabbi, The
Constitutional Harmony and Balance Between Fundamental Rights and
Directive Principles of State Policy: Nehru‟s Perception, 14 INDIAN B.R. 151, 15558 (1987) (discussing Mehru‟s criticism of the judiciary‟s interpretation of the
relationship between Directive Principles and Fundamental Rights found in
Parts III and IV of India‟s Constitution); Jagat Narain, Judges and Distributive
Justice, in JUDGES AND THE JUDICIAL POWERS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUSTICE V.R.
KRISHNA IYER 198-210 (Rajeev Dhavan et at. eds., 1985) (arguing that judges
must be more creative in their approach rather than “mere law finders” to
further socialism and democracy together).
301. See Anil Divan, Op-Ed, Judicial Activism and Democracy, HINDU, Apr. 2,
2007, http://www.hinduonnet.com/2007/04/02/stories/2007040200941000.htm.
302. See Sathe, supra note 266, at 249-311 (tracing the development of the
court‟s judicial activism and its acceptance by the people of India).
303. Divan, supra note 301.
304. Mohd Haris Usmani, Public Interest Litigation, LEGALSERVICEINDIA.COM
(Dec. 1, 2008), http://www.legalserviceindia.com/article/l273-Public-InterestLitigation.html.
305. M.N. Rao, Judicial Activism, (1997) 8 S.C.C. (Jour.) 1 (India).
306. For further discussion of this topic see Hugh Corder, Judicial Activism of
a Special Type: South Africa‟s Top Courts Since 1994, in JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN
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example of judicial activism in Africa is provided by the
jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court.
The long history of apartheid, the role which the judiciary
played in it, and the radical transformatory foundation laid
down by the South African 1996 Constitution has led to, as
one commentator puts it, “judicial activism of a special
type.”307 The cue for this is laid down in section 39 of the
South African Constitution, which states:
1. When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum
a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; b) must
consider international law; and c) may consider foreign law.
2. When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum
must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of
308
Rights.

It is worth noting that section 39 merely requires the
South African judge, “[w]hen interpreting” the Constitution,
to do what judges should normally do when interpreting a
constitution, that is, to give effect to its values. This is not
necessarily
synonymous
with
judicial
activism;
nevertheless, it does make it much easier for a judge to
adopt an activist stance. In some cases decided since the
final Constitution came into effect in 1996, which are
discussed below, the judges have adopted an activist
approach and in doing so have frequently used section 39
language such as “constitutional values” and “the spirit,
purport and objects of the bill of rights.”309 This has,
however, only served as a starting point. As most of these
cases show, the judges have often tried to adapt the law in a
COMMON LAW SUPREME COURTS, supra note 239, at 323, 323-62; Dennis Davis,
Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: The Record after Ten Years, 2 N.Z. J.
PUB. & INT‟L L. 47, 47-48 (2004) (challenging the approach taken by the
Constitutional Court of South Africa in cases involving socio-economic rights).
See generally Craig Scott & Philip Alston, Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities
in a Transitional Context: A Comment on Soobramoney‟s Legacy and
Grootboom‟s Promise, 16 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 206, 206-08 (2000) (discussing
constitutional development in South African judicial activism as a result of
Soobramoney and Grootboom).
307. Corder, supra note 306, at 328-31.
308. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch.2, § 39.
309. See infra text accompanying notes 310-69.
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manner that will reflect the changing mores of the society.
Further, the activist approach has been more pronounced in
certain areas of the law than others.
On account of its recent history, South African judges
have felt less restraint and quite courageous and innovative
in dealing with human rights matters. One of the first cases
that came before the Constitutional Court, S. v.
Makwanyane,310 concerned the highly sensitive issue of the
death penalty,311 which the apartheid regime had regularly
used in trying to undermine the resistance to its inhumane
system. The sensitivity of the matter was not only
compounded by the fact that the use of the death penalty
had been suspended, but it also came at a time of rising
crime rate.312 Both the Constitutional Assembly that
adopted the Constitution and the South African Law
Commission had been unable to agree on the matter and
had decided to leave it—in the words of the latter—to the
“Solomonic” wisdom of the courts.313 The Court, after
reviewing the legislative history of the drafting of the
Constitution and relying primarily on the prohibition of
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and punishment,
as well as on the rights to human dignity and equality,
concluded that the death penalty did not have a place in the
legal system of a democratic South Africa.314
Corder, after noting the public outcry against this
judgment, concludes that it:
[R]epresents a brave and principled staking of a claim for the
authority of the judiciary in general and the Constitutional Court
in particular to pronounce on matters of great social controversy,
and even on occasion to go against the likely social consensus in
315
giving expression to the words of the Constitution.

In Bhe v. Magistrate of Khayelitsha316 the Constitutional
Court was faced with yet another issue left open by the
310. 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.).
311. Id. at 401-02.
312. Id. at 408, 441-42.
313. Id. at 407-09.
314. Id. at 403-07, 409-10, 440.
315. Corder, supra note 306, at 332-33.
316. 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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failure of the constitution to adequately reconcile and
balance the right to equality with customary law. The
matter the Court had to decide was whether in the new
constitutional dispensation, two young girls born outside
marriage recognized in civil law could be deprived of the
right to inherit their father‟s estate.317 Under the relevant
and applicable customary law of succession the principle of
primogeniture would have applied to cause the estate to
accrue to their paternal grandfather.318 In granting an order
that the legislative provisions under which this happened
were invalid, the Constitutional Court relied on the
infringement of the right to equality and dignity of women
and the rights of the child enshrined in the Bill of Rights.319
The court, after a detailed consideration of the customary
law rule of primogeniture, concluded that it was
inconsistent with the Constitution insofar as it
discriminated against women and extramarital children.320
To fill the gaps left by the declaration of invalidity, and
pending Parliament finding the time to revise the law, the
Court crafted a number of specific measures to guide
inferior courts faced with a similar situation.321
Another example of judicial activism came in Minister of
Home Affairs v. Fourie,322 a case dealing with same-sex
marriages. Two women in a long stable domestic
relationship sought to be married, and because this was
prohibited, sought an order of mandamus requiring the
Minister of Home Affairs to recognize their union and a
declaration that the common law definition of marriage was
unconstitutional.323 Although some of the judges in the
Supreme Court of Appeal, whilst agreeing that the
definition was no longer tenable, felt that it was for
Parliament to change the law,324 the Constitutional Court
declared the common law definition and the relevant
317. Id. at 594-97.
318. Id. at 593-97.
319. Id. at 607-12.
320. Id. at 617-23.
321. Id. at 633.
322. 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) (S. Afr.).
323. Id. at paras. 1-6.
324. Id. at para. 135.
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sections in the Marriage Act unconstitutional.325 The Court,
however, suspended the declaration and gave the
legislature one year to change the law.326 In reaching this
conclusion, Justice Sachs, for the majority, while
acknowledging the importance of religion in public life,
ruled that it would be improper to use the religious
sentiments of some as a guide to the enjoyment of
constitutional rights of others.327
It is perhaps in the area of the protection of socioeconomic rights that the South African Constitution was not
only very innovative but has provided the courts with the
opportunity to develop principles recognized and respected
worldwide. A number of cases dealing with the right to
housing and health illustrate the extent of judicial activism
in this area. As Corder puts it, “[t]he formulation of socioeconomic rights [in the Constitution] clearly anticipates a
relatively extensive but nuanced judicial role for their
appropriate realization, and the judges have generally not
disappointed.”328
The leading case on the problem of housing is the case
of Government of the Republic of South Africa v.
Grootboom,329 involving the plight of 900 women and
children330 living in an informal settlement under cold and
wet conditions.331 The High Court ordered the provision of
emergency shelter to the children and their parents, relying
on the suffering and “immediate and urgent” need of the
children333 and on the straightforward language of the
Constitution.334 The State appealed to the Constitutional
325. Id. at para. 114.
326. Id. at para. 162. For a critique of the decision, see N. Bohler-Muller,
Judicial Deference and the Deferral of Justice in Regard to Same-Sex Marriages
and in Public Consultation, 40 DE JURE 90 (2007).
327. See Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie, 2006 (1) SA 524 (CC) at paras. 8892 (S. Afr.).
328. Corder, supra note 306, at 341.
329. 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.).
330. Id. at para. 4 n.2.
331. Id. at paras. 7-11.
333. Id. at para. 80.
334. Id. at para. 19 (“Every child has the right . . . to basic nutrition, shelter,
basic health care services and social services.” (quoting S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch.
2, § 28(1)(c))).
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Court, arguing that it had a logical plan for the provision of
housing in an orderly and systematic manner and that the
High Court‟s order would disrupt these plans by privileging
certain groups over those patiently waiting on a housing list
and adding expenditures to scarce resources.335 The
Constitutional Court, while acknowledging the difficulties of
the situation, pointed to the absence of mechanisms for
dealing with the emergency needs of those in dire need of
housing as a flaw in the plans and affirmed the order.336 In
reaching this conclusion, the court was clearly going out of
its way to look at the massive social needs for public
housing and was willing to hold the executive accountable
for the way it was dealing with the problem.
This approach was taken further in a series of cases,
including President of the Republic of South Africa v.
Modderskip Boerdery (PTY) Ltd.337 Because of acute
overcrowding in an informal settlement in Johannesburg,
thousands of people moved to neighboring farm land and
erected basic shelters in which to live.338 The landowner
failed through various lawful means to evict the squatters
and went to the Pretoria High Court seeking affirmation of
his property rights and an acknowledgment that the state
had an obligation to resolve the issue.339 The Constitutional
Court, in affirming the novel remedy of constitutional
damages that had been awarded by the High Court, held
that the state was obliged to provide effective dispute
resolution mechanisms for its citizens and had failed to do
so in this case.340 The Court, once again recognizing the
gravity of a social problem, made it clear that the state was
under a duty to take action.341
In Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Group
(TAC),342 the Constitutional Court was faced with a highly
sensitive political case in which the applicants contested the
335. See id. at paras. 63-65.
336. Id. at paras. 93-98.
337. 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC) (S. Afr.).
338. Id. at 9-11.
339. Id. at 9, 11.
340. Id. at 21-27.
341. Id. at 22-23.
342. 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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state‟s policy of selecting test sites for the provision of antiretroviral drugs to HIV-positive mothers and their new-born
children and sought the right to these services for every
child.343 The Minister resisted the application, questioning
the constitutional obligation of government to provide an
“effective, comprehensive[,] and progressive program[]” such
as that argued for by TAC.344 The Court, while
acknowledging that “[c]ourts are ill-suited to adjudicate
upon issues where Court orders could have multiple social
and economic consequences,”345 refused to be swayed by the
State‟s argument that it should confine itself to a
declaratory judgment.346 It decided that it was under a duty
to grant effective remedies in all cases, including, in this
case, an order for mandamus and the exercise of
supervisory jurisdiction.347
Besides introducing the notion of constitutional
damages in the Modderklip case, the judges in South Africa
have also been active in crafting appropriate remedies and
processes as the circumstances warrant. In Permanent
Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v.
Ngxuza,348 the appellants had challenged the right of the
defendants to act on behalf of other extremely poor people
whose disability grants had been arbitrarily terminated by
the provincial government because of problems of fraud.349
The Supreme Court of Appeal, in a clear instance of activist
law-making, considered this a classic instance in which a
class action could be brought and then proceeded to set out
the hitherto undefined elements of a class action in South
African law.350 In Jaftha v. Schoeman351 the appellant had
lost her home to settle a debt of 250 rand based on section
66(1)(a) of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act, which authorized
sales in execution against the immovable property of
343. Id. at 728-29.
344. Id. at 729.
345. Id. at 740.
346. Id. at 758.
347. Id. at 758, 764-65.
348. 2001 (4) SA 1184 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
349. Id. at 1190-91, 1194.
350. Id. at 1201-03 .
351. 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) (S. Afr.).
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judgment debtors.352 It was a piece of legislation which had
been abused considerably, especially in rural areas, leading
to many people losing their homes worth more than the debt
for which execution is being levied to discharge the debt.353
When the matter came before the Constitutional Court, it
was held that the provision in the Act authorizing such
sales was unconstitutional for being overbroad in effect and
easily capable of being used by unscrupulous individuals to
take advantage of debtors.354 Instead of referring the matter
to Parliament to amend the Act, the court held that the
defect would be remedied by reading into the offending
section the words, “a court, after consideration of all
relevant circumstances, may order execution.”355 Although
reading into statutes words that will enable it to make
sense is a common interpretative technique, it has been
rightly suggested that what the court did here was a
reflection of its desire to provide “greater protection for the
vulnerable in society” and also a reflection of “growing
judicial impatience with the legislature‟s slow passage of
legislation to address” society‟s deep rooted problems.356
Another remedy crafted by the South African courts is
the concept of structural interdict, which has also been used
with great success to overcome governmental inertia.357 In
its judgment in August v. Electoral Commission,358 the
Constitutional Court for the first time made use of a
structural interdict, which directs a violator to take steps to
rectify a violation of rights under the court‟s supervision.359
352. Id. at 144-45, 148-49 (quoting Magistrates‟ Courts Act 32 of 1944 §
66(1)(a) (S. Afr.)).
353. See id. at 147.
354. See id. at 159-61.
355. Id. at 164.
356. Corder, supra note 306, at 352-53.
357. See generally Danielle Elyce Hirsch, A Defense of Structural Injunctive
Remedies in South African Law, BERKELEY ELECTRONIC PRESS (Sept. 4, 2006),
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1690 (follow “Download the Paper”
hyperlink) (arguing that structural interdict has been effective and is necessary
to secure the broad socio-economic rights guaranteed by the South African
Constitution).
358. 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.); see also supra text accompanying notes 169175.
359. Id. at 378-80. The decision has influenced other courts. See Sauvé v.
Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, paras. 37, 58-59 (Can.)
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This followed a holding that the Electoral Commission had
violated prisoners‟ rights to vote by failing to take steps to
allow them to register as voters on the national voters‟
roll.360 The Court ordered the Commission to make
arrangements for them to register and once registered to
vote in the election.361 A similar order was given by the court
in Strydom v. Minister of Correctional Services,362 in which
the prison authorities were ordered to report on affidavit to
the court within a month of the order, setting out a
timetable for the upgrading of the electrical system in the
Johannesburg prison.363
It is worthwhile also pointing out that the South
African courts have not used the workings of section 39(2) of
the Constitution to unlock their creative powers in dealing
only with constitutional disputes but have in many cases
tried to realign well established common law principles to
reflect the new constitutional values. In National Media
Ltd. v. Bogoshi364 and again in Khumalo v. Holomisa365 the
courts restated and extended the principles of the common
law of defamation in the new constitutional era. In Minister
of Safety and Security v. Van Duivenboden366 and Van Eeden
v. Minister of Safety and Security,367 the courts consciously
applied section 39(2) to extend the Roman-Dutch concept of
wrongfulness in the light of recent developments in English
law. In what has been considered to be “one of the most farreaching and activist judgments yet delivered,” the
(holding that a Canadian law denying the right to vote to individual serving two
or more years in a correction facility was not a justifiable limit to democracy);
Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. 681, paras. 38-39
(discussing August); see also Cormac Behan & Ian O‟Donnell, Prisoners, Politics
and the Polls, 48 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 319, 320-22 (2008).
360. August v. Electoral Commission, 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) at 378 (S. Afr.).
361. Id. at 379.
362. 1999 (3) BCLR 342 (W) (S. Afr.).
363. Id. at 359-60.
364. 1998 (4) SA 1196 (SCA) (S. Afr.) (“[T]he common good is best served by the
free flow of information.”).
365. 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) at para. 22 (S. Afr.) (holding that the Constitution
and common laws of defamtion were not inconsistent and common law heeds to
balance constitutional interests of human dignity and freedom of expression).
366. 2002 (6) SA 431 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
367. 2003 (1) SA 389 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
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Constitutional Court, in NK v. Minister of Safety and
Security,368 drawing on comparative analysis and earlier
South African case law, handed down a test of vicarious
liability consistent with section 39 of the Constitution.369
Thus, as in India, the activist approach has in many
respects progressively established principles which have
strengthened the values espoused by the South African
Constitution. It is now necessary to see what impact such
an approach has on promoting Constitutionalism.
c. Implications of Judicial Activism on the Judicial Role
in Promoting Constitutionalism. It is necessary to preface
this discussion by cautioning that judicial activism must not
be a license for judicial arbitrariness. In this regards, the
words of Justice Rao of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
are particularly instructive. He said:
[J]udicial activism should not result in rewriting of the
Constitution or any legislative enactments. Reconciliation of the
permanent values embodied in the Constitution with the
transitional and changing requirements of the society must not
result in undermining the integrity of the Constitution. Any
attempt leading to such a consequence would destroy the very
structure of the constitutional institutions. Conscious of the
primordial fact that the Constitution is the supreme document,
the mechanism under which laws must be made and governance
of the country carried on, the judiciary must play its activist role.
No constitutional value propounded by the judiciary should run
counter to any explicitly stated constitutional obligations or
rights. In the name of doing justice and taking shelter under
institutional self-righteousness, the judiciary cannot act in a
manner disturbing the delicate balance between the three wings
370
of the State.

Similar sentiments have been expressed by an Indian
Supreme Court justice in Morcha:
[T]he court . . . possesses the sanction of neither the sword nor the
purse and . . . its strength lies basically in public confidence and
support, and . . . consequently the legitimacy of its acts and
decisions must remain beyond all doubt. . . .

368. 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC) (S. Afr.).
369. Corder, supra note 306, at 357.
370. Rao, supra note 305.
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Indeed, both certainty of substance and certainty of direction are
indispensable requirements in the development of the law, and
invest it with the credibility which commands public confidence in
371
its legitimacy.

While the activist role so far taken by the South African
judiciary is commendable, there is at least one case that
illustrates the dangers of “unrestrained activism” by which
a judge injects his personal views into judgments or
expresses his political preferences in a manner that may
lead to far-reaching political consequences that could
undermine the body politic of the country. The judgment of
Justice Nicholson in National Director of Public
Prosecutions v. Zuma372 is a case in point. The trial judge set
aside the decision by the National Director of Public
Prosecutions to indict the respondent, Jacob Zuma.373 When
the matter came before the Supreme Court of Appeal, the
court concluded that in the course of his judgment, the trial
judge subverted the judicial function by:
[A] failure to confine the judgment to the issues before the court;
by deciding matters that were not germane or relevant; by
creating new factual issues; by making gratuitous findings against
persons who were not called upon to defend themselves; by failing
to distinguish between allegation, fact and suspicion; and by
transgressing the proper boundaries between judicial, executive
374
and legislative functions.

As Deputy President Harms put it:
The independence of the judiciary depends on the judiciary‟s
respect for the limits of its powers. Even if, in the words of the
learned judge, the judiciary forms a „secular priesthood‟ this does
not mean that it is entitled to pontificate or be judgmental
especially about those who have not been called upon to defend

371. Morcha v. Union of India (Bonded Labour Case), A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802, 844
(1983) (India) (Pathak, J., concurring).
372. 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA) (S. Afr.).
373. Id. at paras. 1, 88. It will be recalled that the African National Congress
used this decision as a basis for “recalling” President Thabo Mbeki from office, a
few months before his term was supposed to end in 2008.
374. Nat‟l Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Zuma 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA) at para. 15
(S. Afr.).
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themselves—as said, its function is to adjudicate the issues
375
between the parties to the litigation and not extraneous issues.

One will concede that this case is an aberration in an
otherwise judicious use of the powers given to the judiciary
by the constitution. Be that as it may, the danger posed by
unrestrained judicial activism should be noted.
If the judiciary is to play an effective role in promoting
constitutional governance in Africa, it is contended that it
must liberate itself from being perceived as the handmaiden
of the executive, and act boldly and decisively to enforce
both the letter and spirit of the law. In fact, it can be argued
that the judges in Africa today must act as the last line of
defense to arrest the looming authoritarian resurgence. At
this critical juncture in Africa‟s constitutional development,
when most political institutions are facing a credibility and
legitimacy crisis, courts can make a difference. A modern
judiciary can no longer obtain social and political legitimacy
without making substantial contributions to issues of social
justice.
A number of interesting lessons can be drawn from this
brief comparative perspective of judicial activism. The first
is whether there should be a constitutional mandate for
judicial activism. In countries such as England and Israel,
without written constitutions, there is still judicial
activism.376 Nevertheless, the broad mandate provided in
the Indian and South African Constitutions is very helpful.
The main advantage of a constitutional injunction is that it
may help to keep judicial activism within bounds and
prevent both extremes of judicial passivity and judicial
adventurism. Besides this, it must now be recognized and
accepted that the effectiveness of the constitution depends
very much on the ability of judges to breathe life and
relevance into its provisions to ensure that they are not
frozen in time. This means going beyond the normal
common law judicial liberalism which enables judges to
refer to, cite, and rely on the decisions of courts in other
common law jurisdictions as persuasive authorities.377
375. Id. at para. 19 (internal citation omitted).
376. Brice Dickson, Comparing Supreme Courts, in JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
COMMON LAW SUPREME COURTS, supra note 239, at 1, 11-14.
377. Id. at 3.
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Because of the commonality not only in the provisions
of many constitutions but also the fact that they have been
inspired by the same philosophy, it is now imperative that
judges, in dealing with legal problems, investigate how
these problems have been solved in other jurisdictions, both
by national and international courts. Although the judicial
outcome equally depends on how thoroughly the counsel on
both sides have done their research, the fundamental
character of the common law as a system in which judges
draw their inspiration from the basic conceptions of justice
and fairness should remain the driving force.378 In
interpreting the law, judges must try to keep in step with
the standards and values of the times.
African
constitutional
systems
have
borrowed
extensively from Western constitutional models in areas
such as separation of powers, but these borrowed models
have to be adjusted and adapted to the conditions unique to
each country.379 There is no reason, therefore, why the
concept of judicial activism should be an exception.
A passive judiciary in the face of Africa‟s overbearing
executives and the constitutional weaknesses of the
legislature, compounded by the looming phenomena of one
party domination leading to the rubber stamping of
legislation, does not augur well either for progressive or
effective legislation. The timely intervention of the high
courts in India and South Africa has not only resulted in
defective legislation being promptly remedied. Additionally,
new remedies and processes have been introduced to
address serious social problems that the government and
legislature have been too slow or indifferent to address.
Thus, both in India and South Africa, the highest courts
have devised imaginative means to facilitate access to
courts by the poor and needy.
In India, the courts sidetracked the rigid doctrine of
locus standi by introducing the device of socio-legal

378. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 10-13 (1991)
(characterizing “replicability” and “responsiveness” as core ideals of common law
jurisprudence).
379. See Charles Manga Fombad, The Separation of Powers and
Constitutionalism in Africa: The Case of Botswana, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J.
301, 316 (2005).
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commissions of inquiry in the cases of Morcha380 and
Gupta.381 In South Africa, the Constitutional Court achieved
a similar end by introducing the concept of class action in
South African law in the Ngxuza382 case. In the South
African cases of Grootboom,383 Modderskip,384 and TAC,385 the
South African courts had no hesitation in taking decisions
that compelled the government to urgently address the
desperate social needs of the poor. To ensure that
government effectively complied with court decisions, the
South African courts in the TAC case exercised supervisory
jurisdiction a circumstance where some courts would not.386
380. Morcha v. Union of India (Bonded Labour Case), A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 802, 846
(1983) (Sen, J., concurring).
381. Gupta v. Union of India, (1982) 2 S.C.R 365, 520 (India).
382. Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v. Ngxuza
2001 (4) SA 1184 (SCA) (India).
383. Gov‟t of the Rep. of S. Africa v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (S. Afr.); see
supra text accompanying notes 329-36.
384. President of the Rep. of S. Africa v. Modderskip Boerdery (PTY) Ltd. 2005
(5) SA 3 (CC) (S. Afr.); see supra text accompanying notes 337-41.
385. Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Grp. (TAC) 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC)
(S. Afr.); see supra text accompanying notes 342-47.
386. Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Grp. (TAC) 2002 (5) SA 721, 758
(CC) (S. Afr.). In contrast, see the more conservative approach adopted by the
full bench of the High Court in the Botswana case of Kamanakao I v. Attorney
General:
We have now come to the point where we can deal with the
requirements of the applicants for orders designed to compel the
Government of Botswana to take positive steps to appoint and
recognize Wayeyi Chiefs . . . . As a matter of judicial policy the courts
are reluctant to issue orders for carrying out of works and other
activities which require their supervision. It is obvious that for a court
to issue orders requiring positive action on the part of the government
on a continuing basis is a mammoth task.
The performance by government of required activities to fulfil [sic] the
orders sought by the applicants must involve, inter alia, careful
planning, budgeting and funding, manpower and other inputs on the
part of the State . . . . The court, in our view, would be incapable of
supervising the required activities and would thus be unable to judge
whether the performance is adequate, or to know whether the person
ordered has willfully [sic] disobeyed the order, in the event of a
complaint of lack of execution. Now it is a well known rule of our law
that courts should not issue orders for doing things which they would
not be capable of supervising.”
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They have also used the structural interdict in the August387
and Strydom388 cases to achieve a similar result; in similar
circumstances, the Indian courts have adopted the policy of
setting up a monitoring agency. Fearing that an
amendment by the legislature of an unconstitutional piece
of legislation may take too long to take effect and therefore
cause undue hardship, the South African courts did not
hesitate, in Jaftha v. Schoeman,389 to remedy the defect by
reading into legislation words that would make it conform
to the Constitution. It is perhaps in the defense of
constitutionalism that judicial activism in South Africa has
manifested itself in the most endearing manner. In
Makwanyane390 and again in Bhe,391 the Constitutional
Court did not hesitate to provide clarity to ambiguities
resulting from the inability of the Constitutional Assembly
to agree on certain controversial issues.
The main lesson that can be drawn from this brief
discussion is that judicial activism is a powerful weapon
which judges all over Africa can use not only to counter
authoritarianism but also to promote policies that are
socially and economically progressive. As B.O. Nwabueze
has observed, “when the courts seek to confine their own
function unduly by a narrow, positivist interpretation of the
law, constitutionalism may be endangered.”392 However, the
ability of judges to influence the direction of future
constitutional developments will also depend on their
willingness to look beyond the national frontiers and the
national legal system to see what ideas can be borrowed
from other jurisdictions. This raises the important question
of the role of cross-systemic fertilization.

[2001] 2 BCLR 654, 676-677 (Bots.) (emphasis added).
387. August v. Electoral Comm‟n 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) (S. Afr.).
388. Strydom v. Minister of Correctional Servs. 1999 (3) BCLR 342 (W) (S.
Afr.).
389. 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC) (S. Afr.); see supra text accompanying notes 351-56.
390. 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.).
391. 2005 (10) SA 580 (CC) (S. Afr.).
392. B.O. NWABUEZE, JUDICIALISM IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 286 (1977).
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F. Cross-systemic Fertilization of Constitutional Law Ideas
and Concepts
There is little evidence from the post-1990 African
constitutions that African constitutional experts made
serious efforts to learn from the experiences of their
neighbors, especially where there are differences in
constitutional and legal culture. This is particularly true of
Francophone Africa.393 In fact, the main reason why the
prospects for constitutionalism have been far better under
the constitutions of Anglophone African countries than
those of Francophone African countries is that while
reforms in all these countries have drawn substantially
from their colonial legal heritages, the Anglophone African
countries have approached these reforms with more
openness and have looked far beyond England for
inspiration and guidance.394 Members of constitutional
reform commissions have travelled to Europe, North
America, Asia, and notably India, in order to learn more
about modern constitutional developments.395 Many
Francophone African constitutional draftsmen, by contrast,
have continued to seek inspiration from and rely almost
slavishly on what they perceive as the most reliable and
unassailable constitutional model: the Gaullist Fifth
Republic model and the timid amendments that have been
made to it in the last fifty years.396
Recent developments suggest that African nations do
not need to go abroad to look for and copy Western
constitutional models. For example, the South African
Constitution of 1996 has not only incorporated the best
elements of Western constitutional systems but has so
adapted this to its historical, social, and cultural context
that it is now a model which even some Western countries
can emulate. Evidence of cross-systemic fertilization
393. See Filip Reyntjens, The Winds of Change. Political and Constitutional
Evolution in Francophone Africa, 1990-1991, 25 J. AFR. L. 44, 51 (1991)
(indicating that Francophone countries have continued to rely on the French
constitutional model, despite years of “innovations and experiments”).
394. Charles M. Fombad, Constitutional Reforms in France and Their
Implications for Constitutionalism in Francophone Africa, AFRIMAP (June
2008), http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/paper/AfriMAP_Fombad_Eng.pdf.
395. Id.
396. Id.
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involving the borrowing of ideas from the civil law system in
the South African constitution include the mixed system of
control over determining the constitutionality of laws which
is both centralized and decentralized, providing for both
abstract (preventive) and concrete (repressive) review.397
The Constitution envisions an expansive approach to
interpreting its provisions especially in section 39, which
states that in interpreting the Bill of Rights, the courts
must “promote the values that underlie an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom,” and must also consider international law as well
as foreign law.398 It is thus no surprise that the South
African Constitutional Court has rendered very innovative
and ground breaking decisions, especially in the area of
socio-economic rights, which are respected and followed in
many jurisdictions.399 Judge Guido Calabresi of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit points out
that several post-1945 constitutions were modeled on the
U.S. Constitution, but that exercise of American influence
did not prevent the U.S. from learning from the experiences
of emergent constitutional democracies, observing that
“[w]ise parents do not hesistate to learn from their
children.”400
The universality of certain constitutional law principles
and standards is no longer in doubt.401 In fact, it seems that
397. See S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 6, § 146.
398. Id. ch. 2, § 39.
399. See, e.g., Pres. of the Republic of South Africa v. Modderskip Boerdery
(PYT) Ltd. 2005 (5) SA 3 (CC); Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Group
(TAC), 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.); Gov‟t of the Republic of South Africa v.
Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC).
400. United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995).
401. Some constitutions specifically require that certain international
instruments should be taken into account in interpreting their provisions. For
example, the preamble to Benin‟s Constitution refers to these international
instruments and states that their provisions “make up an integral part of this
present constitution and of Beninese law and have a value superior to the
internal law.” CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF BENIN Dec. 2, 1990, pmbl. This is
repeated in article 7 in regards to the African Charter on Human and Peoples‟
Rights (“ACHPR”). Id. art 7. Article 40 imposes on the state a duty to teach its
citizens about the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“UDHR”), the ACHPR, and any other “international instruments duly ratified
and relative to human rights.” Id. art. 40. In fact, the ACHPR is attached as an
annexure to the Beninese constitution. The most significant effect is given to
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a court can hardly deal with a human rights dispute today
without being invited by counsel to consider one foreign
authority or another. More often than not, the reliance on
these foreign authorities has been rather eclectic with scant
or at most superficial references to the techniques of
comparative law. Although, as a discipline, comparative
constitutional law is still very much in its infancy and its
techniques are still lacking in methodological rigor and
coherence, it is increasingly necessary for judges to be
conscious of its existence and to make efforts to study,
understand, and apply its methods and techniques when
considering the relevance and applicability of foreign legal
authorities. The comparative approach broadens one‟s
vision and does not necessarily need to result in copying
foreign examples, but learning from them and using
international comparative law as tools in domestic
adjudication.402 In borrowing from foreign sources there are
therefore skills and techniques which judges must learn,
and language resources which should be made available to
them.403 Unless the judiciary is ready to learn about and
address current developments both nationally and
internationally, judicial decisions will retain a rigid,
positivist orientation, which is bad for both human rights
protection and social justice.404 Lord McCluskey in the
international law by the Bill of Rights in the Angolan and South African
Constitutions. Article 26 of the Angolan Constitution states:
(1) The fundamental rights provided for in the present law shall not
exclude others stemming from the laws and applicable rules of
international law.
(2) Constitutional and legal norms related to fundamental rights shall
be interpreted and incorporated in keeping with the Universal
Declaration of the Rights of Man, the African Charter on the Rights of
Man and Peoples and other international instruments to which Angola
has adhered.
(3) In the assessment of disputes by Angolan courts, those international
instruments shall apply even where not invoked by the parties.
CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA Aug. 25, 1992, art. 26 (emphasis added).
402. Julia Laffranque, Judicial Borrowing: International & Comparative Law
as Nonbinding Tools of Domestic Legal Adjudication with Particular Reference
to Estonia, 42 INT‟L LAW. 1287, 1289 (2008).
403. Id. at 1301.
404. Id. at 1294 (“Comparative law has proven to be extremely useful in the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe in reconstructing their legislation and
legal order.”).
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opening paragraph of his book, Law, Justice and
Democracy, highlights some of the challenges when he says:
If I were to be asked what temptations any new judge is exposed
to, I should have to admit that they include arrogance, self-esteem
and impatience. That answer must alarm all who know that the
principal qualities a judge must possess are humility, modesty
and tolerance. But just think of the facts. He has been elevated to
a position in which he wields a royal authority. The apparatus of
state lies ready to enforce his orders. The visible symbols of his
office, the way he dresses, the place in which he sits, the manner
in which he is addressed, the respect which he is accorded, all are
designed to buttress that authority, to intimidate those who might
405
wish to challenge or evade it.

Judges must therefore resist the intoxicating notion
that their existing legal knowledge is conclusive and be
prepared to keep up with the latest developments in the
law. Another important reason for adopting a willingness to
research and consider developments abroad is the growing
influence on national constitutional law of international
constitutional law standards.406
G. The Internationalization of Constitutional Law
Principles and Standards
No government pursuing modern constitutional design
can ignore certain basic principles, standards, institutions
and values that are considered fundamental and essential
in ensuring the rule of law, constitutional democracy, and
good governance. Nor can states any longer hide behind the
principle of sovereignty and non-intervention to violate
their constitutions in a manner that will not only put the
lives of their citizens at risk but also directly or indirectly
threaten international peace and security. The adoption of a
dysfunctional constitution that results in violence and
political instability poses a threat not only to the state
concerned but to neighboring states and the international
community as a whole.

405. LORD MCCLUSKEY, LAW, JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY 1 (1987).
406. For further discussion on this topic, see Charles Manga Fombad,
Internationalisation of Constitutional Law and Constitutionalism in Africa
(forthcoming).
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Representative instances of dysfunctional constitutional
processes that have threatened international peace and
security include the situations in Côte d‟Ivoire, Sudan, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, Kenya, and
Zimbabwe.407 More recently, uprisings have toppled the
leaders of Tunisia and Egypt and are now spreading to
Libya and other Arab countries in northern Africa and the
Middle East, becoming matters of international concern.408
This is particularly so in Libya, not only because the lives of
thousands of foreign workers on whom their economy
depends have been put at risk, but also due to the brutality
with which the Libyan leader has tried to suppress the
uprising, resulting in thousands of deaths and thousands of
refugees and internally displaced persons.409 Over the years,
there have been attempts to devise international principles
to deal with or preempt such breakdown of domestic
constitutional order.410
The internationalization of constitutional law principles
and standards can be traced to the end of the Second World
War when governments‟ treatment of their nationals
became a matter of legitimate concern for the international
community.411 Since 1945, numerous international
instruments both global and regional now prescribe certain
minimum standards of human rights protection and have
monitoring bodies to scrutinize national performance.
Perhaps one of the most important of these instruments is
407. See, e.g., ELDRIDGE ADOLFO, SWEDISH DEFENCE RESEARCH AGENCY, THE
COLLISION OF LIBERATION AND POST-LIBERATION POLITICS WITHIN SADC: A STUDY
ON
SADC AND THE ZIMBABWEAN CRISIS (2009), http://www.foi.se/
upload/projects/Africa/FOI-R-2770%20Adolfo%20Collision%20of%20Liberation
%20and%20Post-Liberation%20Politics%20in%20SADC.pdf (last visited July
31, 2011).
408. For an analysis of the so called “Arab Spring,” see Eduard Soler & Ana
Almuedo, Popular Uprisings in the Arab World, CIDOB (Jan. 2011),
http://www.cidob.org/en/publications/dossiers_cidob/mundo_arabe_2011/popular
_uprisings_in_the_arab_world.
409. See, e.g., John J. Xenakis, Massive Refugee Crisis in Libya Increases
International Calls for Intervention, BIG PEACE (Mar. 2, 2011),
http://bigpeace.com/jxenakis/2011/03/02/massive-refugee-crisis-in-libyaincreases-international-calls-for-intervention/.
410. Fombad, supra note 69, at 52-53.
411. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST‟S
INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (7th ed. 1997).
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”).412
Although merely a declaration, and thus not strictly legally
binding, its provisions have over the years been so
extensively incorporated in other international and regional
instruments as well as national constitutions that they are
now generally considered to express principles of customary
international law.413 As a result of this special status as
customary international law, the UDHR and other
instruments which contain rules considered as customary
international law are automatically applicable in Common
law countries as part of national law and must therefore be
taken into account in any constitutional design.414
Beyond international treaty obligations, what is
perhaps most significant today is the growing number of
regional and international frameworks that have been
designed to put pressure on African politicians and
constitutional designers to incorporate provisions that
promote certain minimum constitutional standards.415 As a
result, constitutional provisions to promote democracy, good
governance, and respect for the rule of law are no longer
merely options which states can adopt at their pleasure but
are in many instances mandatory obligations for any state
that wants to interact and cooperate with others. In fact,
the internationalization of constitutionalism in terms of the
relevance of standards laid down by the international
community has been increasing in relevance although the
effect may be somewhat mixed.416
At the global level, from the 1980s most of the largest
Western aid donors to Africa, such as Britain, France,
Japan, the United States, and the Scandinavian countries
sought to link aid to constitutional reforms, respect for
human rights, and political as well as economic
liberalization
amongst
receiving
countries.417
The
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank also
412. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
413. MALANCZUK, supra note 411, at 213.
414. See generally JOHN DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN
PERSPECTIVE 51-54 (3d ed. 2005); MALANCZUK, supra note 411, at 67-72.
415. Fombad, supra note 69, at 18-19.
416. Id. at 20-23.
417. Id. at 16.
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attached political conditionality to aid, loans, and
investments to recipient countries.418 The policy of political
conditionality
by
Western
governments
and
intergovernmental organizations such as the World Bank
has been controversial,419 but there is no doubt that these
external forces played a very important role in ushering in
the new era of democratization and constitutional reforms.
Some of the international financial institutions actually
provided financial assistance to many countries to assist
them carrying out activities such as developing electoral
processes, organizing elections, and drafting new
constitutions.420 However, since the 9/11 attacks, Western
governments and IGOs now focus more attention on
security issues than on democracy and constitutionalism.421
The most interesting and potentially significant
international influence on modern African constitutionalism
originated from Africa itself. The wind of democratic change
that swept through the continent in the 1990s was
sufficiently powerful not only to affect individual states but
also a conservative organization like the Organization of
African Unity (“OAU”).422 It is ironic that the first
institutional attempt to commit African states to democracy
and good governance was initiated by the OAU and has
been continued by its successor, the African Union (“AU”).
By the mid 1990s, the OAU could no longer pretend to be
indifferent to the wind of democratization blowing over the
continent. Although by 1981 it had adopted the African
Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights, which recognized a

418. Id. at 43-44.
419. See, e.g., Barbara Grosh & Stephen Orvis, Democracy, Confusion, or
Chaos: Political Conditionality in Kenya, STUD. COMP. INT‟L DEV.,Winter 199697, at 46, 46-61 (arguing that conditioning economic aid on democratization is
counterproductive because it undermines the economic stability necessary for
multiparty democracy and liberal rights); Rolf Hofmeier, Political Conditions
Attached to Development Aid for Africa, 26 INTERECONOMICS 122, 122 (1991)
(“Both the fear and the anger among recipient countries‟ governments with
regard to this new form of external interference are now clearly perceptible, for
they believe it threatens to reach way beyond the economic policy intervention
previously experienced.”).
420. For a more detailed discussion, see Fombad, supra note 69.
421. Id. at 18-20.
422. Id.
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number of fundamental human rights,423 the organization
itself stuck to its policy of not intervening to condemn
human rights abuses in the different countries.424
By the early 1990s, this was beginning to change, and
perhaps one of the major signs of this came during the June
1997 summit in Harare.425 The leaders for the first time
agreed that the organization would not accept or recognize
any regime which had removed a legitimately elected
government.426 During the Lome Conference of July 2000
the leaders came out with one of the most significant
statements, the Declaration on the Framework for an OAU
Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government.427
Although it could, with some justification, be argued that
the leaders were more interested in protecting themselves
from military adventurers than in promoting democracy per
se, this declaration contains some important principles on
promoting good governance and stability.428 Coming as it
did, on the very eve of the establishment of the AU, it is now
considered as one of the documents implementing the AU‟s
democracy and good governance agenda.
The basic framework for promoting democracy and good
governance amongst member states of the AU is laid down
in the Constitutive Act setting up the Union and a number
of treaties, declarations, and other instruments. There are
four major instruments that contain the basic democratic
principles on the AU democracy agenda:429 the Constitutive

423. See African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples‟ Rights, adopted
June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into
force Oct. 21, 1986).
424. Fombad, supra note 69, at 18-20.
425. See Roundtable of Heads of Government of Commonwealth Africa on
Democracy and Good Governance in Africa, 41 J. AFR. L. 250, 250-52 (1997).
426. Fombad, supra note 69, at 18-19.
427. See Declaration for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of
Government, July 10-12, 2000, AHG/Decl. 5 (XXXVI), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/lomedec.htm.
428. See id. (calling for, among other things, the adoption of democratic
constitutions, separation of powers, political pluralism, and free and regular
elections).
429. Fombad, supra note 69, at 18-23.
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Act itself,430 the Declaration on the Framework for an OAU
(AU)
Response
to
Unconstitutional
Changes
of
Government,431 the Declaration on the Principles Governing
Democratic Elections in Africa,432 and fairly recently, the
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.433
In fact, the latter contains some fairly radical ideas, and it
is no surprise that since it was adopted in 2007 not many
countries have ratified it.434 Mention must also be made of
the New Partnership for Africa‟s Development (“NEPAD”)435
and the African Peer Review Mechanism (“APRM”)436 which
are supposed to provide a vision and strategic framework
for Africa‟s renewal.437
The relevance of all these developments to future
constitutional progress on the African continent is twofold.
First, it can be said that the AU democracy agenda is today
one of the boldest and most daring initiatives that the
leaders of the continent have ever embarked on. The record
so far has been neither good nor encouraging. Although the
Constitutive Act and the various instruments provide a
solid framework for peer pressure to be brought to influence
constitutional developments on the continent, the inability
of the AU to deal with the situations in Sudan, Somalia, and
430. Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted Nov, 7, 2000 (entered into
force May 26, 2001), available at http://www.au.int/en/content/constitutive-actafrican-union (follow “Constitutive Act of the African Union” hyperlink).
431. See Declaration for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of
Government, July 10-12, 2000, AHG/Decl. 5 (XXXVI), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/compilation_democracy/lomedec.htm.
432. See OAU/AU Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic
Elections in Africa, July 8, 2002, AHG/Decl. 1-2 (XXXVIII), available at
http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/oaudec.pdf.
433. African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, Jan, 30, 2006,
available at http://www.un.org/democracyfund/Docs/AfricanCharterDemocracy
.pdf
434. One of its far-reaching provisions, article 15, requires State Parties to the
Charter to establish institutions supporting democracy, id. at art. 15(1), and
“ensure that the independence and autonomy of the said institutions is
guaranteed by the constitution.” Id. art. 15 (2).
435. THE NEW PARTNERSHIP
(last visited July 27, 2011);

FOR

AFRICA‟S DEVELOPMENT, http://www.nepad.org

436. THE AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM, http://aprm.krazyboyz.co.za (last
visited July 27, 2011);
437. See Fombad, supra note 69, at 32-34.
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Zimbabwe raises serious doubts about the agenda‟s
credibility.438 The AU agenda on democracy and good
governance reminds one of the “proverbial dog that danced
on its hind legs, the significance of which lies less in how
well it danced and more on the fact that it could dance at
all.”439 The mere recognition by African leaders that
democracy and good governance is critical to the continent‟s
recovery and survival is a giant step in the right direction.
Second, the evolution of international law and recent
developments in certain Western countries such as Britain
and Belgium coupled with the indictments of Charles
Taylor, former president of Liberia, and the issuance of an
international warrant for the arrest of Sudanese President
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, is bound to affect future
constitutional designs.440 As regards the latter, that this is
the first warrant of arrest ever issued for a sitting Head of
State by the International Criminal Court suggests that in
the future, present or former rulers who have committed
crimes against humanity in their attempts to hang on to
power, can expect to be arrested and tried under
international law anywhere regardless of the scope of any
immunities that they may have under national
constitutions.441
If it was a crime to kill half a million people in Rwanda
in 1994, it should also be a crime to cause millions of
innocent people, especially vulnerable populations like
children and the elderly, to die of hunger and malnutrition,
or through lack of adequate health care as a result of
438. See, e.g., Egara Kabaji, Op-ed, Libya Crisis Exposes AU‟s Soft Underbelly,
NAIROBI STAR, Apr. 6, 2011, http://www.nairobistar.com/opinions/others/19967libya-crisis-exposes-aus-soft-underbelly.
439. Fombad, supra note 69, at 38.
440. In 2009, Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”)
issued an arrest warrant for Omar Al Bashir for war crimes and crimes against
humanity. ICC Issues a Warrant of Arrest for Omar Al Bashir, President of
Sudan, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Apr. 3, 2009), http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Press+and+Media/Press+Releases/ (follow “Press Releases
2009” link). He was suspected of “being criminally responsible, as an indirect
(co-) perpetrator, for intentionally directing attacks against an important part of
the civilian population of Darfur, Sudan, murdering, exterminating, raping,
torturing and forcibly transferring large numbers of civilians, and pillaging
their property.” Id.
441. See, e.g., Fombad & Fonyam, supra note 82, at 484-85.
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misrule and corruption. All that remains now is to recognize
the unacceptability, bestiality, and inhumanity of
dictatorship for what it is, a crime that should be included
in the crimes against humanity. There is a need for the
recognition of an economic crime against humanity to be
created to try rulers who have caused their people to die
needlessly through bad governance.442 In spite of this, it can
be argued that one of the strongest antidotes against
authoritarian resurgence is the people.
H. Robust Defense of Constitutions and Constitutionalism
by a Vigilant Civil Society
Looking at the present developments in Africa, it will be
perhaps too optimistic to expect any constitutional reforms
as far-reaching as those that took place in the 1990s and the
ensuing few years. It is more realistic to expect some
changes which, though radical, may take place in an
incremental manner. Even then, a constitution, however
comprehensive and good it is, cannot on its own guarantee
either good governance or constitutionalism. As one looks to
the future of the constitutional rights revolution in Africa,
there seems to be no better method of both promoting and
sustaining the momentum of constitutionalism and good
governance, while simultaneously restraining actual and
potential governmental lawlessness than through the
vigilance of civil society.
Gerald Caiden rightly points out that people usually get
the government they deserve.443 If they are diligent,
demanding, inquisitive and caring, they will get a good
government.444 However, if they allow themselves to be
intimidated, bullied, deceived and ignored, then they will
442. For a similar idea put forward by a 2004 Nobel Peace Laureate, see
Wangari Maathai, Address at the 4th U.N. World Women‟s Conference in
Beijing, China: Bottle-Necks of Development in Africa (Sept. 1995), available at
http://gos.sbc.edu/m/maathai.html. See also Chris J. Bakwesegha, The
Organization of African Unity and the Democratization Process in Africa:
Lessons Learned, UN NON-GOVERNMENT LIAISON SERVICE, http://www.unngls.org/documents/publications.en/voices.africa/number8/3bakwese.htm
(last
visited Apr. 29, 2011).
443. Gerald E. Caiden, Public Maladministration and Bureaucratic
Corruption, in FRAUD, WASTE AND ABUSE IN GOVERNMENT 30, 47-48 (1986).
444. Id.
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get a bad government.445 Politicians are ordinary mortals
and not saints.446 Africans, in most cases, do not elect
inherently bad leaders.447 They elect potential Nelson
Mandelas, such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Kenneth
Kaunda of Zambia, and Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon.
They, however, then close their eyes, lean back, relax, and
hope to enjoy the promised land of democracy and good
governance, or transform these ordinary mortals into
infallible, indispensable and irreplaceable saviors whose
departure from power must be viewed with trepidation.448 In
South Africa, the African National Congress is so adored
that it can do no wrong and hence its leaders can do no
wrong.449 Any accusations of impropriety against its leaders
445. Id.
446. “If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be
necessary.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 164 (James Madison) (Bernard Bailyn
ed., 1993); see also Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner & Andreas Schedler,
Introduction to THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN
NEW DEMOCRACIES 1, 3 (1999) (placing Madison‟s observation within the context
of horizontal accountability).
447. T.W. Bennett suggests that tyranny is an African disease of the modern
era: “A certain degree of political insecurity . . . explains why an African ruler‟s
power could not, in the past, have been absolute. Anyone who attempted
tyrannical rule would soon face revolt or secession . . . . A common saying has it
that kgosi ke kgosi ka batho [a chief is a chief through his people].” T.W.
BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 105 (2004). Although he was
referring to the situation in Southern Africa, the same is true in many other
parts of the continent, especially West Africa.
448. In fact, many of the founding fathers either invested themselves, which
was usually the case, or were invested with messianic epithets such as: Osagyefo
(the Victorious Warrior) for Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana; Mwalimu (the
Teacher), for Julius Nyerere of Tanzania; Mzee (the Elder) for Jomo Kenyatta of
Kenya; Le Grand Silly (the Elephant) for Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal;
Nkuku Ngbendu wa Za Banga (All powerful warrior who goes from conquest to
conquest) for Mobutu Sésé Seko of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the
Congo); Le Vieux (the Old Man) for Félix Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d‟Ivoire; Le
père de la nation (father of the nation), for Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon; and
more recently, Ngwazi (the Great Lion) for the current President of Malawi, Dr.
Bingu wa Mutharika. Some arguments for removing constitutional term limits
are discussed in Fombad & Inegbedion, supra note 88.
449. See Raymond Suttner, The Character and Formation of Intellectuals
Within the ANC-Led South African Liberation Movement, in AFRICAN
INTELLECTUALS: RETHINKING POLITICS, LANGUAGE, GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 8, at 177, 146-48 (suggesting that the rhetoric of ANC leadership
after 1994 has become conclusory, thereby discouraging open intellectual
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can only be the machinations of racists suffering from the
hangovers of apartheid.450 In other African countries, any
criticism of a leader is viewed as the diabolical ploy of
people who do not belong to the leader‟s tribe and want to
replace the incumbent with their own tribesman.451 In many
of these countries, the opposition, where it is real, is
regularly castigated by the government media as
unpatriotic dreamers and adventurers whose advent to
power must be prevented at all cost.452 Because we have
continued to deify our leaders today once they are elected to
power, as we did in the recent past, they forget about those
who elected them and rely only on the small cliques that
repressively keep them in power, lose touch with the
electorate, and are accountable only to them. Today we are
haunted by the old demons of authoritarian rule which we
had hoped were exorcised through constitutional reforms
and multi-party democracy.
A constitution is only as good as the manifest will of the
people to defend it. A robust civil society will not only
enable the democratic transition to start, but will help to
resist eventual reversals, contribute in pushing transitions
to their completions and finally help to consolidate and
deepen democracy.453 As Steven Friedman has rightly
argued, “[t]here will never be effective democracies in Africa

debate, and that state patronage further contributes to this phenomenon
through co-option of dissenters).
450. As noted earlier, the call for lifestyle audits in South Africa to check the
rising tide of corruption and abuse of power has been termed a “‟smokescreen‟
masking „racists narratives‟” by those who feel that “black Africans cannot be
wealthy without being corrupt.” Lifestyle Audits, supra note 193.
451. For example, in March 2011, the Secretary General of the ruling ANC in
South Africa blamed “racial prejudice” and “hatred for change” for certain media
criticisms of government decisions and actions. Fienie Grobler, ANC Blames
Racism for Manyi, Gupta Controversies, ALLAFRICA.COM (Mar. 8, 2011),
http://allafrica.com/stories/201103090286.html; see also Raji Bello, Our
Destructive
Obsession
with
Tribalism,
http://www.gamji.com/article
6000/NEWS7267.htm (last visited July 27, 2011); Anneli Botha, Political
Dissent and Terrorism in Southern Africa 10-11 (Inst. for Security Stud., ISS
Paper 90, 2004), http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/papers/90/90.pdf.
452. See Fombad, Challenges, supra note 3, at 10-18.
453. See JUAN J. LINZ, & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS
TRANSITIONS AND CONSOLIDATION 3-14 (1996).
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until citizens can hold government accountable.”454 To
ensure that the good people we elect today do not become
the tyrants and dictators of tomorrow, the public must be
ready to protest against any actual or threatened violations
of the constitution. In fact, the creative intervention of the
judiciary depends as much on the willingness of civil society
(professional or business groups, and activist groups
composed of urban and middle class people) especially the
media and the activist quality of the Bar.
The judicial role in legal reforms can also be enhanced
when there are vibrant civil society organizations that are
ready to speak up for the weak, the poor, and other voiceless
members of society through amicus curiae representation in
court.
Civil society in general and the legal profession in
particular are the watchdog for the respect of the rule of
law, advocates for legal reforms and those who articulate
the diverse and intricate legal and social issues that the
judges need to consider in deciding cases. In many
countries, these two groups can fill the void left by the
absence of an effective and credible opposition party. And in
looking at the crucial role that the Bar needs to play, one
can rightly say that the judiciary in Africa is only as good as
the Bar that serves it; an activist Bar will inevitably lead to
an activist judiciary, and the converse is also likely to be
true.
Finally, mention must be made of the important role
that legal scholars—such as legal academics, legal
researchers and others who contribute to the dissemination
of legal knowledge in accredited journals, books and
newspaper commentaries and internet blogs—can play in
influencing legal developments. As Joseph Ki-Zerbo has
argued, intellectualism is not a neutral exercise and African
intellectuals cannot afford to decamp from public life like
nomads to an oasis while all around is torture, mutilation,
and genocide.455 Legal scholars therefore need to be more
vocal in defending the constitution and respect for
constitutionalism.
454. Steven Friedman, A Crucial, But Only the First, Step, in DEMOCRACY IN
AFRICA: PROMOTING THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON DEMOCRACY, ELECTIONS AND
GOVERNANCE, supra note 139, at 3, 4.
455. Ki-Zerbo, supra note 8, at 80-81.
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CONCLUSION
In form and content, there is no ideal or standard
constitutional design or model that is irreproachable and
unimpeachable nor one that will solve all problems.
Furthermore, a constitution is not a contract that is struck
once and for all, but rather an important part of a
continuous process of careful maintenance and step-by-step
incremental accommodation to take account of changing
circumstances.
A
constitution
that
promotes
constitutionalism must therefore allow scope for strategic
dialogue between the rulers and the ruled. From this
perspective, the need to rethink and revise many aspects of
the post-1990 African constitutions is inevitable. The major
contention in this Article has been that the changes of the
1990s, although significant and far-reaching, just fell short
of making constitutionalism on the continent irreversible
and sustainable. They failed to entrench the degree of
constitutionalism found in Western Europe, where a
reversal is difficult or hazardous. For example, while as a
result of a strong constitutional culture, a coup d‟état in
countries such as France or Britain is extremely unlikely,
what constitutionalism appears to have done in many
African countries is not to eliminate coups d‟état but in
many instances replace military with electoral coups
d‟état.456 This is not to suggest that no military coups d‟état
can take place under a constitution that entrenches and
promotes all aspects of constitutionalism, but such an
environment simply does not favor coup plotters.
Be that as it may be, African constitutionalism has now
joined the mainstream of modern constitutionalism and
456. Examples of such electoral coups d‟état have taken place in Kenya in 2007
and Zimbabwe in 2008. See INT‟L REPUBLICAN INST., KENYA PRESIDENTIAL,
PARLIAMENTARY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT ELECTIONS: ELECTION OBSERVATION
MISSION FINAL REPORT
30-37
(2007),
http://www.iri.org/explore-ourresources/election-observation-and-assessment-reports
(follow
“Election
Observation Report: Kenya‟s 2007 Presidential, Parliamentary and Local
Elections” hyperlink); DEREK MATYSZAK, RESEARCH & ADVOCACY UNIT, HEAR NO
EVIL, SEE NO EVIL, SPEAK NO EVIL: A CRITIQUE OF THE ZIMBABWE ELECTORAL
COMMISSION
REPORT
ON
THE
2008
GENERAL
ELECTIONS
(2009),
http://www.idasa.org/our_products/resources/output/hear_no_evil_see_no_evil_s
peak/ (follow hyperlink under “Files: Full Report”); Kenyan Presidential Election
Blatantly Rigged, FREE FREEDOM (Dec. 31, 2007), http://www.freefreedom.
wordpress.com/2007/12/31/kenyan-presidential-election-blatantly-rigged/.
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even started offering some quite original contributions to its
developments, a typical example of this being South Africa‟s
state institutions‟ support of constitutional democracy.
Although not perfect, this support helps to check the
inevitable excesses of a dominant one-party system, bearing
many of the features of the discredited single parties of
yesteryears. The major contention of this Article is that
more action was required to deal with those specific issues
that were a source of bitter conflicts in the past. For
example, the multi-party debacle was more than just the
prohibition of opposition parties—at the heart of it was the
neutralization and criminalization of dissenters. There was
an assumption that by allowing opposition parties to
operate, multi-party democracy would take root.457 However,
the restrictions and obstacles placed on the operation of
opposition parties in most countries has rendered them
redundant. As a result, the single party has been replaced
by dominant parties operating in exactly the same reckless
and arbitrary manner as the post-independence single party
systems.
If a constitution manifestly embodies the values of
constitutionalism, it will certainly include what most people
hold as dear, and consider as prima facie right and good,
and thus will most likely be treated with great respect, if
not veneration. If the post-1990 constitutional changes were
designed to give African countries a fresh start, as most
modern constitutions since the United States Constitution
of 1787 usually try to do, then the general result of this
process must be considered as mixed, insofar as the
commitment to constitutionalism, good governance, and
accountability is concerned. There have been tremendous
progress in some cases and dismal failure in others. South
Africa‟s Constitution clearly stands out as an exemplar of
modern constitutionalism and provides a rich source from
which many African countries can learn. But even this good
constitution is under threat from opportunistic politicians
and a docile majority happy with having their own kind in
charge regardless of what they are doing.
To entrench and sustain constitutionalism, good
governance, and accountability on the continent, a number

457. See Mokopakgosi & Molomo, supra note 69, at 3-6.
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of important reforms need to be made.458 First, the right to
free and fair election as well as the rights of political parties
needs to be constitutionally entrenched in so as to reduce
the possibilities for electoral fraud and other electoral
irregularities. Second, while tremendous steps have been
taken in most constitutions to promote constitutionalism,
there is need to strengthen this with the entrenchment of
certain key principles and institutions of accountability,
good governance, and democracy. Third, there is need to
limit the excessive powers that are usually given to African
leaders and the immunities that go with this, because they
have regularly used such power to entrench themselves in
power and make genuine opposition politics impossible.
Fourth, to enhance the judicial role which is crucial in
promoting constitutionalism, it has been argued that the
458. Many of the suggested principles and institutions may look like
superfluous aberrations to a Western constitutionalist or in a Western setting
but in Africa, they must now be regarded as essential elements in the emerging
constitutional rights culture of today. It is true that a constitution should not be
cluttered and overloaded with trivia and one should not attack the vice of
inadequate breadth with the equally fatal infirmity of overbreadth. One must
therefore be mindful of the advice of K.C. Wheare that a constitution should
contain “[t]he very minimum, and that minimum [should] be rules of law.” K.C.
WHEARE, MODERN CONSTITUTIONS 33-34 (1966). Or, as Chief Justice Marshall
put it in the celebrated United States case of McCulloch v. Maryland, a
constitution by its very nature requires that only its “great outlines” be marked
and its “important objects” designated, and that it not descend into the
“prolixity of a legal code.” 4 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). A good number of
African constitutions have indulged in such lengthy, programmatic, and
convoluted details that defy the wisdom of both Wheare and Marshall. For
example, the Swaziland Constitution, which has 279 sections and nineteen
chapters, is essentially a chaotic catalogue of contradictions that make nonsense
of the essentials of constitutionalism while dwelling on matters which should
normally be found in ordinary legislation. See CONST. OF THE KINGDOM OF
SWAZILAND July 26, 2005. Another example is the Nigerian Constitution, which
has 318 sections and seven chapters, which may be understandable for such a
large and complex society. See CONST. OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA May
29, 1999. It must be recognized that African constitutions cannot be as brief as
Western constitutions. Written constitutions in Africa contain almost every
relevant and applicable constitutional principle, whereas Western constitutions
rarely embrace all the constitutional principles that apply. These are normally
complemented by a number of usages, understandings, customs, and
conventions that may apply as well as judicial precedents. Over and above this,
most Western constitutions are greatly strengthened and supported by centuries
of political behavior, political culture, and political tradition and history, which
is generally lacking under many African constitutions.
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bodies that appoint judges should be made more
independent and the scope for judicial review needs to be
expanded to include both abstract and concrete review and
courts dealing with constitutional review should be
decentralized to make constitutional justice more accessible
in terms of cost and proximity to the people who need it
most.459 Fifth, in this era of globalization and
regionalization, it has been argued that constitutional
drafters as well as judges cannot ignore the influence of
certain constitutional law principles and standards that
have been adopted at both regional and international levels.
A new constitutional framework that ignores the
imperatives
of
cross-systemic
and
international
developments is bound to be dysfunctional.
In spite of the need for a new wave of reforms, more
urgent and radical in some countries than in others, it is
recognized that the momentum for radical changes might
not be there now. It is a fact that many leaders of the
ancient regime who have weathered the storm of the 1990
revolutionary waves and those leaders who emerged from it,
are not anxious for further reforms for various reasons. This
has led us to two conclusions that we think are fundamental
to the future of constitutional reforms and constitutionalism
in Africa today.
The first is that no matter how comprehensive the
protections envisioned in the text of a constitution, it will
mean nothing if the people are not ready to defend it.
Sycophancy, idolatry, complacency, and indifference have
encouraged dictatorship. People will only get the type of
rulers they want. Ultimately, a constitution is only as good
as the people who are ready and willing to defend it.
Secondly, standing firmly between the people and the rulers
is the judiciary generally and judges in particular. For the
process of constitutionalism, good governance, and
accountability to take root, African judges need to adopt a
bold, imaginative, and judicially activist approach similar to
that which has been manifested by the South African
Constitutional Court in many of its decisions.460
After five decades of African independence, many
lessons have been learned the hard way and the errors of
459. See supra text accompanying notes 267-76.
460. See supra Part III.E.3.b.
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the past do not have to be repeated. The mammoth political,
economic, and social challenges of the future cannot be
confronted head-on without an irrevocable commitment to
constitutionalism and all that this principle stands for.
Once a country has crossed the constitutionalism Rubicon,
the chances of it backsliding into anarchy or dictatorship
are considerably reduced. The absence of constitutionalism,
good governance, and accountability mechanisms in the
constitutions of many African countries explains why there
is still doubt whether the third wave of democratization will
do any better than the preceding ones. The good prospect for
constitutionalism in certain countries such as Ghana and
South Africa certainly does not guarantee constitutional
rule, good governance, or democracy. Nevertheless, its
presence acts as a powerful deterrent to potential dictators
or tyrants.

